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1. Introduction 
 
CrESSI has developed a theoretical-analytic framework to explore the economic underpinnings of 
marginalisation and social innovation in Europe. This framework takes an institutionalist perspective 
that draws on a range of theoretical contributions from economics, sociology and philosophy. From 
this framework it is possible better to understand the structural determinants of marginalisation and 
social innovation that operate within the market and social sphere. In order to tackle marginalisation, 
it is necessary to identify and address the structural processes that give rise to it. Similarly, the 
conditions under which social innovation flourishes or fails need fully to be understood to explore its 
potential as a driver of structural change. CrESSI proposes that marginalisation and social innovation 
are shaped by the prevailing socio-economic and political system. Drawing upon prior work in 
economic sociology – notably that of Beckert (2010) - this process is described here as framed and 
shaped by a ‘Social Grid’ wherein co-evolutionary relationships shape the social and economic space 
within which marginalisation (and other socio-economic phenomena) occurs. Concomitantly, these 
social dynamics also influence the capacity for social innovation to act as a means of redress. This 
Social Grid is comprised of three key social forces: ‘institutions’, ‘social networks’ and ‘cognitive 
frames’ (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The Social Grid (Beckert, 2010). 
 
According to the framework, these three social forces do not exist in isolation – they operate in 
dialectic with one another. The context- and time-specific equilibrium between institutions (rules or 
norms), cognitive frames (mental structures with which people filter reality), and networks, which 
constitute the social reality of relationships, communication and exchange between people, resembles 
a specific institutional dominance (von Jacobi and Nicholls, 2017a). The social dynamics between 
institutions, social networks and cognitive frames will have some bearing on the prevalence of 
marginalisation within a given society and the capacity for social innovation to address this.  
  
This has important implications for social innovation policies and innovations in social policy. First 
of all, the social dynamics described are often poorly attended to in the policymaking process. For 
example, a policy initiative will challenge public perceptions of Roma communities (cognitive 
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frames) or promote civic engagement (social networks) without in parallel addressing institutional 
arrangements and social dynamics that are complementary. Further, implementation of social 
innovation often occurs without a wide and deep consideration of the structural factors that affect its 
nature, potential and effects. Social innovation initiatives or funding for it often do not fully account 
for external costs and constraints that need to be overcome. Ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of social 
innovation often overlook its reflexive nature and, thus, the diffuse feedback-effects it may have on 
policy and on the three key social forces outlined. Crucially, whilst public policies have the capacity 
to alter social relations and the dynamics between them, the Social Grid also shapes and constrains 
the development and implementation of policy itself. Such process of structuration is iterative and 
constant and has significant effects on how public policy perceives, conceptualizes and responds to 
the causes and manifestations of marginalisation, as well as to which degree social innovation is seen 
as policy solution. 
This report is structured as follows: part I outlines key notions of an analytical framework with which 
social innovation policymaking needs to confront itself. Part II focusses on current policy 
shortcomings at the European level and part III summarizes the key policy recommendations that 
CrESSI has identified thanks to theoretical and empirical work. While the topics covered may be of 
interest to a wider audience, it may be of particular interest to policy-makers, policy analysts and 
researchers in the social sciences. 
 
 
PART 1 - Analytical framework 
 
2. The broad landscape of social innovation and of policies that may 
support it  
 
Two axes with which to conceive of social innovations: 
 
Social innovation is often conceived of as a means to implement a known end, e.g. 
job creation or the reintegration into work force. In the best case, social innovation 
serves for the aim of introducing plurality into the provision of welfare services. In 
the worst case, social innovation is abused of to save public resources and 
responsibility. Yet, there are also many social innovations that are borne out of the 
desire to take genuine goals forward, which are new and not necessarily in line 
with traditional goals of top-down driven policies. They embed visions and values 
with innovative goals and therefore represent an important leeway for co-creation 
in policy-making.  
 
On the side a simple representation of the continuum that can be observed in the 
social innovation landscape: some innovative processes insert into traditional 
goals that are top-down driven, such as employment creation or other attempts of 
social inclusion usually pursued by social policies. Other social innovations on the 
other hand introduce completely new ambitions, such as e.g. being independent 
from big supply chains in food consumption and therefore represent grass-root 
driven initiatives in which values that are emerging in society are channelled into 
new forms of organisations. 
 
For policy-making, recognition of this difference has important implications: 
where social innovations are used as means to achieve consolidated policy goals, 
the kind of support needed is different than in those cases in which social 
innovations are introducing completely new topics. Policy-making needs to distinguish and to 
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consider differentiated strategies for those social innovations that need to be treated as new ends. The 
more social innovations move towards the top of this axis, the more they become true channels of 
agency for civil society. For policy making support to social innovations with true potential of co-
creation implies much greater openness to what people value and pursue. 
 
Below, a second axis is depicted on the hand of which social innovations can be viewed. It refers to 
the degree of disruption that they potentially enshrine: most social innovations have incremental 
nature, seeking to improve or complement existing institutional dominance. Sometimes, however, the 
implications of social innovation may be more disruptive, by e.g. discrediting existing cognitive 
frames or rules and by contributing to the breaking down of previous networks. 
 
 
 
While the terms used are tentative, in the sense that it is difficult to clarify exactly what is 
"disruptive" (van der Linden and van Beers, 2017), the axis interprets social innovations as 
"conservative" when they do not alter the existing equilibrium between prevalent social forces in 
society, namely cognitive frames, social networks and institutions intended as rules of the game. This 
second axis therefore represents a continuum in terms of the attitude towards existing institutional 
dominance. When combining these two axes, a clearer picture emerges on the variety of types of 
social innovations that can be observed (figure 1). 
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Figure 2 hints, that as long as social innovation is treated as means to existing policy goals, its 
transformative potential is limited because of reduced inflow of new ideas and reduced critique of 
existing structural arrangements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where the ambition of policy-making is to unleash the democratic potential of social innovation, 
efforts need to go towards those approaches that propose alternatives to existing arrangements, even 
if this sometimes means putting own institutional dominance at risk or into question (Edmiston, 
2015, 2016a; Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017).  
 
In figure 3, a synthetic 
grouping of different 
kinds of social 
innovations is sketched: 
these can comprise public 
sector improvements and 
new coalitions across the 
public, private and third 
sector, but also more 
open-ended support to 
grass-root initiatives and 
to broader processes that 
may ultimately lead to 
social change in line with 
democratic values. 
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relevant mainly to avoid misleading "one-size-fits-all" approaches in which support is intended to 
benefit different typologies contemporaneously. Flexibility in the design of support to social 
innovation seems to be key. 
 
Figure 4 depicts some examples of typologies of support that could be given to the different types of 
social innovations. Where social innovations occur within the public sector, mainly with the aim to 
improve service efficiency and modalities of delivery, the kind of support needed is more of 
administrative type, e.g. by rationalizing on concurring initiatives, or by overcoming "silo" thinking 
which makes different ministries, departments or sections work in isolation without exchange. 
Especially within the realm of tackling marginalisation this seems to be a problem, as deprivation 
tends to be multidimensional (Sen, 1999) and disadvantage "corrosive" (Chiappero-Martinetti, 
Peruzzi and Spreafico, 2014) leading often to a condition in which single social service providers are 
bound to experience failure unless they embrace a more holistic approach that tackles different 
dimensions of social disadvantage at once.  
  
Public sector reform may therefore promote significant social innovation by simplifying, bypassing 
and modifying existing rules and practices. A good example is the Brazilian conditional cash-transfer 
programme Bolsa Familia thanks to which 25% of the population, considered to be vulnerable and 
poor, has been reached with a social policy that aims at breaking the generational transmission of 
poverty.  
 
Administrative steps that were key were linked to the creation of a new dedicated ministry that 
forced collaboration across different ministries (horizontally, e.g. across health, education, social 
services, housing, etc.) and across governmental levels (vertically, e.g. Federal Union, Federal States 
and municipalities). A series of innovations emerged from such improved dialogue among public 
sector levels, e.g. the creation of a unique dataset CadUnico, which is a single registry for vulnerable 
families that seek support from social policies, and currently comprises about 99 million individuals 
(Simões, 2012; Soares, 2012; von Jacobi, 2014). A common database does not only facilitate access 
to information but also fosters the breaking down of "silo" thinking as different ministries all use the 
same information tool for their diagnosis and policy designs. 
  
In some cases public sector reform necessarily implies the opening up to new partnerships, either 
with the private or the third sector. Such new "alliances" can represent important innovations when 
the prevalent logic of one sector (e.g. market-driven, non-for profit) overcomes the typical obstacles 
of the public sector embedded in the working principles of bureaucracy and of politics. Sometimes, 
the formation of new "coalitions" or of new typologies of actors/intermediaries may also imply new 
"roles" for consolidated policy levels. In case the EU-level leapt over national governments, for 
example, to seek direct collaboration with local authorities, or even with local third-sector 
organisations, this would also resemble a new kind of "coalition" with strong potential for social 
innovation in its actions.	
  
For such cases, the scope for supporting social innovation through policy making has mainly to do 
with increases in flexibility and openness to "new ways of doing old things", possibly with new 
partners and new distributions of responsibilities. A more difficult quest for policy-making however 
relates to those initiatives that seek to depict rather new horizons for society.  
 
 
Why neo-classical economics only tells half the story in case of social innovation 
 
In line with Europe's 2020 strategy of smart, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, the Bureau of 
European Policy Advisers (BEPA) suggests that ‘a “social innovation” culture has spread in support of the 
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Europe 2020 Strategy and its implementation. Despite claims that the social and economic objectives of 
Europe 2020 are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, there appears to be a continuing tendency to focus on 
‘after-market intervention’ rather than socialising the function of the economy to address marginalisation 
across Europe (Grusky and Wimer, 2010). By acknowledging (and addressing) the limitations of neoclassical 
economic assumptions, which still have a profound influence in mainstream economics and the functioning of 
the market, it is possible to attend meaningfully to the economic underpinnings of social innovation. Perhaps 
the most crucial weakness of the neoclassical economic (NCE) approach is its supposedly amoral conception 
of the market and economic growth. In fact, however, the NCE approach is moral, or at least normative, in 
several respects. According to neoclassical economics, individuals should pursue self-interest, because only 
via this route can the highest possible level of output (maximum welfare) be attained. Both the objectives of 
the market − maximization of economic growth − and human behaviour are normatively prescribed in this 
regard. If economic growth is achieved in ways that create inequality or marginalise people, this is justified in 
two ways. First, wealth inequality or poverty reflects an individual’s marginal productivity. In other words, the 
causes of marginalisation are conceived on the basis of individual agency with little appreciation of the role of 
socio-structural dynamics that shape the individual factors of marginal productivity or exclusion (economic or 
otherwise). Second, higher rates of economic growth thus attained allow society to compensate those who 
have been less fortunate in the market. Thus, a market may be perfectly efficient and optimal, despite a high 
degree of marginalisation arising from its operation (Sen, 1970). 
(1) Within neoclassical economics, individual motivation and incentive structures are rather narrowly 
conceived as a matter of self-interested rational choice. Yet, the very notion of a social market economy 
challenges the NCE approach by suggesting that economic actors and institutions can and should make social, 
economic and/or political commitments to others via economic transaction. The NCE approach leaves little 
conceptual or applied space for ethical individualism or economic actions and motivations rooted in the 
interests of others. This poses a particular challenge for explaining and scaling social innovation, which 
principally derives its purpose and character from incentive structures orientated towards the welfare of others. 
(2) A theoretical framework capable of analyzing social innovation needs to recognize the plurality and co-
dependence of incentive structures. However, it also needs to capture the financial and non-financial capital 
that contributes towards social innovation. Trust, motivation and commitment are broadly necessary to realize 
social or economic commitments. 
(3) The NCE approach tends to conceive of markets at a level of abstraction that is rather static and 
ahistorical. In addition, NCE was not originally developed to deal with innovation, and it can deal with 
(technical) innovation only when some of its core assumptions – such as perfect competition, and perfect 
information regarding the costs and consequences of economic transactions − are relaxed. An accurate 
analysis or effective measure designed to facilitate social innovation must accommodate and account for 
uncertainty and dynamic efficiency, as, by its very nature, social innovation involves experimentation, and 
thus a high degree of uncertainty. The dynamics and processes that enhance or stifle social innovation are 
subject to socio-structural factors (see introduction). 
(4) A neoclassical economics understanding of social innovation struggles to reconcile the creation of 
knowledge and the financial support necessary for its sustained development. When the returns on an 
innovation are social in nature (i.e. cannot be privately appropriated), how is the creation of knowledge 
financially supported? This is an enduring challenge for social innovation that seeks to create and disseminate 
new knowledge. Particularly, when that knowledge supports the development of products, services and 
processes in a non-exclusive way. Namely, where the benefits of knowledge creation are diffuse (accruing, for 
example to society generally) and so too are the financial and social returns. This can lead to an under-
production of new knowledge necessary for social innovation.  
(5) Similarly, a theoretical framework centred on neoclassical economics is less able to capture the non-
economic returns of social innovation. The financial resources and investments available to support innovation 
tend to be contingent on specified, short-term, private and financial returns. The benefits of social innovation 
are often long-term, social and non-monetized. Sourcing funds for social innovation designed to tackle 
marginalisation is particularly difficult in this regard. For example, the fulfillment of capabilities is hard to 
quantify and the economic returns of such are invariably diffuse. An economic sociology of social innovation 
is better equipped to account for this.  
[extracted and adapted from Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015b: D1.4 Policy Brief] 
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Sometimes the goals pursued by social innovations are not altering structural factors too much. They 
may for example avoid putting existing rules into question, and simply promote an idea that takes an 
existing trend one step further. An example could be Solidarity Purchasing Groups (SPG) in Italy, 
which are in line with a general trend of preferring organic food and of growing mistrust in the food 
industry. Solidarity Purchasing Groups are groups of individuals or families that self-organize in 
order to collectively buy food or other everyday consumption goods, selecting suppliers of such 
goods on the basis of solidarity and critical consumption criteria. In Italy, the prevalently informal 
movement is supporting mainly small-scaled organic farming but also other alternative production 
realities such as involving ex-prisoners or people with disabilities. This action can be viewed as 
grass-root initiative with potential impact on small-scaled, organic farming and other kinds of 
typically marginalised production realities (Chiappero-Martinetti, von Jacobi and Maestripieri, 
2017). The initiative tends to construct new networks and to bypass existing intermediaries of food 
distribution, such as supermarkets. Yet, their actions cannot be viewed as radically changing social 
structures, mainly due to their reluctance to engage in any kind of political activity (Maestripieri, 
2017). 
  
Another example investigated in the CrESSI project is the Kiútprogram, or Way-Out Programme 
(Molnár, 2017) that seeks to overcome deeply rooted prejudices against Roma in Hungary through an 
integrated approach that combines microcredit with supportive activities seeking to improve social 
capital (especially knowledge and networking capabilities) of Roma in their attempt to engage in 
successful self-employment or small businesses. While the initiative represents an important attempt 
to fill in gaps in public provision, it is led by actors in the non-for-profit sector and is dependent on 
philanthropic and public (e.g. EU in the pilot phase) funding. Its potential to permanently alter social 
structures crucially depends on continuity of the action, which is not guaranteed. Support to these 
typologies of social innovation, which bring in new ideas, building upon chunks of existing social 
networks in the attempt to extend and broaden them requires delicate calibration. Conditionalities in 
public tenders and in project funding may often represent barriers in this sense, for example because 
grass-root initiatives maintain an informal nature (SPGs typically refrain from constituting a formal 
association) or because process- and time-constraints embedded in project funding frustrate emergent 
processes that need longer time frames and more breadth of action to properly unfold (Kiútprogram, 
see Molnár, 2017). More scope for experimentation and less conditionalities of funding appear to be 
viable tools in this case. 
  
 
Last but not least, policy support to social innovation also implies providing those framework 
conditions that actually make it possible for new grass-root initiatives to emerge. This first of all 
requires the careful construction and maintenance of an environment of trust: not only among 
citizens, which is typically associated to the levels of social equality, cohesion and the absence of 
violent episodes, but also trust in institutions and their work is important. So, outreach and 
dissemination of policy activity is an important field of action. When it comes to social innovation 
for the marginalised, a further important issue is the investment in the capability to associate: poor 
and deprived people often lack the time, resources and connections to engage in initiatives that better 
represent their aspirations and needs. Support should therefore flow into careful attempts to foster the 
ability of marginalised people to speak up, to meet others with similar needs and to promote own 
initiatives. 
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Social Impact Bonds (SIB), which in CrESSI have been studied in the UK, represent a combination 
of these different social innovation typologies. These are payment by results (PBR) contracts that 
leverage private social investment 
to cover the up-front expenditure 
associated with welfare services. 
In the UK, the desire to improve 
service quality, mitigate risks 
associated with service 
experimentation and enhance the 
social outcomes achieved using 
public resources has pushed for 
welfare pluralism. SIBs are one 
of the latest manifestations of this 
trend seeking to stimulate public 
sector innovation and maximum 
social impact. On one hand they 
resemble public sector 
innovation, as they are deeply 
embedded in traditional goals of 
social policy-making. On the 
other hand they promote an innovative alliance of actors that fosters plurality in welfare provision by 
making public sector, private investors and third sector actors ally in a common quest to reduce 
marginalisation (Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017). Their holistic (and costly) approach allows for better 
recognition of the needs of the marginalised, by attentively listening to their perception of what 
"good impact" of a social policy directed at them implies. 
 
Figure 5 sketches some ideas for policy support to different typologies of social innovation, in 
particular in view of the rather initial stadium at which social innovation research is currently at: the 
next years are likely to represent a period of consolidation of theory and practice, which however 
will require continued effort to understand social innovation processes and their facilitators. More 
space for experimentation and continued investment in improving metrics of social impact will 
constitute crucial strategies to take support for social innovation further.
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Why social innovation is a path towards systemic change 
Between 2000 and 2010, one of the primary objectives of the Lisbon Strategy was to reduce the extent of 
poverty and social exclusion in Europe. Despite substantial economic growth across the majority of the 
European Union during this decade, Member States did not meet the targets prescribed. With a renewed 
emphasis on the social market economy, Europe 2020 is the EU’s key strategic framework to promote ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’ within and across Member States. This ten-year strategy is designed to 
inform the direction of economic growth and job creation within the European Union between 2010 and 2020. 
The headline targets of this strategy include raising the employment rate, investing in research and 
development, reducing greenhouse emissions, increasing educational attainment and tackling poverty and 
social exclusion. A key feature of Europe 2020 is to facilitate and embed social innovation across Europe to 
‘deliver the kind of inclusive and sustainable social market economy we all want to live in’ (EC, 2009). Social 
innovation includes forms of action, process or change that may affect the social and economic space within 
which marginalisation occurs. There are three domains of public policy that are of relevance in this regard. 
Firstly, there are social innovation policies that are specifically designed to have a direct bearing on the 
capacity for agents and organizations to affect structural change through social innovation. Secondly, 
innovative social policies offer novel approaches to the design and delivery of assistance, services and 
initiatives that have some bearing on structural relations and/or the outcomes of citizens. Finally, there are 
other public policies that, whilst not directly targeting social innovation or marginalisation, have indirect 
effects. There is now a broad recognition that social innovation is contingent on effective coordination across 
the policy spectrum but particularly in the realm of social policy. This has significant implications for the 
design, delivery and evaluation of public policies that seek to facilitate social innovation tackling 
marginalisation.  
As outlined in the theoretical framework adopted in CrESSI and in the introduction to this report, social 
innovation is embedded within existing structural interdependencies. The concentration and dispersion of 
power furthermore affects these relations and the extent to which it is possible for social innovation to address 
societal challenges. Power can be exercised within and across cultural, economic, military, political, scientific 
and environmental domains to enact the macro-structural context. The administration and implementation of 
social innovation embodies a variety of means and ends that work across these domains. The potential of 
social innovation is, therefore, contingent on power relations that exist within and across these areas. This 
raises questions about the relationship between power, marginalisation and social innovation. For example, 
who decides the priorities and strategic framework of the European Union? How do institutions govern the 
behaviour and outcomes of European citizens (particularly those that are marginalised)? Who controls 
common or shared ways of thinking? What role can social networks play in instigating a realignment of power 
when they are concurrently subject to power relations? The transference of power from the powerful to the 
powerless helps ensure that social innovations are enacted, but more importantly, that these are implemented 
in a way that maximally benefits the most disempowered citizens in Europe. Accordingly, if social innovation 
and innovative social policies intend to tackle marginalisation through structural change, it is necessary to take 
account of, and where possible address, the power imbalances that exist at the individual, collective and 
institutional level. Within this framework, the effects, potential and function of social innovation need to be 
seen as directly addressing marginalisation, but also contributing towards structural change that, in turn, alters 
the conditions and processes that lead to poverty and social exclusion. This mode of analysis has significant 
implications for policy design, implementation and evaluation - not only within the arena of social innovation, 
but more broadly across other policy domains. Social innovation is contingent on a complex system. 
Public policy further has many diffuse and unintended impacts. As a result, it is often hard to anticipate how 
individuals are going to respond to legislative or distributive change. It is, therefore, equally, if not more, 
difficult to anticipate how the interconnected and co-evolutionary relationships between institutions, social 
networks and cognitive frames are affected by policy change. In acknowledging the complexity of socio-
structural relations, it becomes particularly difficult to anticipate how and which policies might be able to 
address power imbalances and social forces when the relationships between them are inherently dynamic. 
Further, the irreducibility of socio-structural relationship makes it difficult to assess the efficacy of social 
innovation. However, presuming it is possible to capture this process, if a social innovation does not lead to a 
disruption in social relations, can this be considered a success? Whilst it might directly address some of the 
effects of poverty and social exclusion, it may not directly address the causes of marginalisation. Should such 
an activity be considered a policy priority?  
[extracted and adapted from Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015a: D1.2 Policy Brief] 
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3. The politics of social innovation policy 
 
The ostensible capacity of social innovation to generate political and policy consensus seems to lie in 
its diffuse and indefinite character as an essentially (and perhaps necessarily) contested, or rather 
collaborative concept (Gallie, 1956; Ziegler, 2017a). Instead of only focusing on the alignment, 
complementarity or institutional hybridity through which support for social innovation is procured, it 
also seems important not to neglect the tensions that are avoided accommodated and ignored in the 
social innovation policymaking process (Edmiston, 2016a). A certain (a)political character of social 
innovation policy seems to be prevalent in Europe, hinting for a lack of recognition of that structural 
embeddedness characterizing marginalisation and the possibility of social innovation to act as 
redress.  
By non politicizing the roots of marginalisation, social innovation policy on one hand leaves scope 
for a plurality of opportunities and new collaborations that may be of benefit. However, such 
opportunities are bound to remain of remedial nature, which has two important implications: on the 
one hand, remedial actions betray the supposedly transformative power of social innovation. On the 
other hand, they are more likely to remain scattered and small in scale. This may bear the advantage 
of reducing social inequalities through locally adapted solutions and of guaranteeing pluralism in the 
interpretation of what social innovation really is about. Yet, policymaking in social innovation 
should be aware of the double-edged sword that a lack of politicising implies. It means not replying 
to questions that investigate the drivers of marginalisation and inequality, and possibly even to 
reinforce existing inequalizing mechanisms through the means of social innovation: in Edmiston's 
(2016a) words, "the neutral framing of social innovation in public policy dissuades questions 
concerning culpability, accountability and responsibility regarding marginalisation. For example, 
who is responsible for rising levels of poverty and inequality? How should they be held to account? 
And what role can the market economy play in contributing towards inclusive growth going 
forward?" 
What would a greater politicizing of social innovation imply? Political subjectivity and collective 
action of those most marginalised that are typically seen as final "beneficiaries" of interventions 
seems to be key (cf. Edmiston, 2016a, Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017, Ziegler and von Jacobi, 2018). 
Furthermore, greater reflexivity and awareness of own embeddedness into a specific institutional 
dominance is also necessary to exit a remedial logic and instead support social innovation as a truly 
transformative power for society. How can such embeddedness into a specific institutional 
dominance be interpreted?  
Social innovation is a nested micro paradigm within the prevailing European political economy. 
Specific mind-frames that are prevalent e.g. in macroeconomic policymaking will trickle downwards 
to more specific themes and topics, such as social innovation. Power imbalances that result from 
such mind-frames and their concrete applications through rules, practices and policies will therefore 
be created, reinforced and reproduced at different "levels" of policymaking, across different themes. 
A transference or realignment of power towards the powerless seems to be central to the political 
project of social innovation in Europe (Edmiston, 2016a; Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017). To better 
understand this interplay of different policy levels and the related power relations it is useful to 
investigate which levels and power imbalances can affect social innovation policy agendas. Compare 
this with Edmiston (2015), who also highlights a concrete gap between the de jure or formal 
declarations of the EU and the de facto or concrete implemented action it takes forward:  
 
The definition of social innovation endorsed by the European Commission 
promotes the active participation and empowerment of European citizens 
as a source of and outcome of wellbeing. The European Union has 
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attempted to encourage participatory methods as an approach to domestic 
policymaking and embed it in networks and organizations engaged in 
social innovation. However, consultations on existing strategies tend to be 
more commonplace than initiatives that enable citizens to actually set the 
social and economic agenda themselves. As such, activities and measures 
designed to support social innovation tend to be imposed rather than co-
constructed by stakeholders at different socio-structural levels. Whilst it is 
clear that EU public authorities encourage the means of social innovation, 
there is less cognitive space and institutional support for the ends of social 
innovation (p.3) 
 
Nicholls and Edmiston (2017) further highlight that the precise type of marginalisation addressed - 
specific to each case - will be co-shaped and be co-dependent on a set of specific social forces - 
institutional, social network and cognitive elements of the Social Grid. These social forces, their 
dynamic relationships and their specific political and power particularities will play a role in setting 
the stage of which power imbalances should be addressed in order to tackle marginalisation. Nicholls 
integrates the multi-level nature of these different political elements, reclassifying them in terms of a 
multi-level schema of power. In terms of a political analysis, the three constituent elements of the 
Social Grid (see introduction) can be mapped against specific political forces in society (see Table 1).  
Institutions map against formal government action and structures as rule setting bodies. Within this 
realm two types of social innovation can be observed: External that focuses on social policy to 
encourage social innovation outside of government; Internal that introduces social innovation into the 
policy-making process within government.  
Social Networks map against prevalent power relations in market structures. Within this realm, two 
levels of social innovation are present: macro-level (social dynamic innovation) action that aims to 
(re)shape market structures and dynamics; micro-level (social service innovation) action that 
responds to market as it is.  
Finally, Cognitive Frames map against the reframing action typical of social movements and 
community led, grassroots, initiatives. Here too, two types of social innovation can be seen: formal 
and (semi-) permanent, organized, collective action around a political grievance; informal and 
impermanent, grass-roots clusters of actors around a new idea for change. 
Type of Social 
Innovation 
Social Grid 
Referent 
Institutional Locus Example 
Policy For Social 
Innovation 
Institutions Government Departments 
(External Policy) 
Community Interest Company 
Legislation  
Social Innovation in 
Policy Making 
Institutions Government Departments 
(Internal Policy) 
Social Impact Bonds 
Social Dynamic 
Innovation 
Social Networks Social Enterprises (Systems 
Focus) 
Fair Trade 
Social Service 
Innovation 
Social Networks Social Enterprises (Welfare 
Focus) 
Work Integration Models 
Formal Social Change 
Innovation 
Cognitive Frames Formal Social Movements  Greenpeace 
Informal Social Change 
Innovation 
Cognitive Frames Informal Collective Action  Occupy Wall Street 
Table 1: Typology Of Politics in Social Innovation (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017) 
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This multi-level analysis of politics and power across the socio-structural spectrum allows the inter-
relations of political actors and their agendas to be considered. It reveals where the drivers of social 
innovation policy lie and how well or badly they align with related agendas at other socio-structural 
levels. Such an analysis also helps explain why policy agendas encounter resistance and may fail at 
the implementation phase. This typology also underlines the observations made above concerning the 
dangers of institutional dominance and centralization in terms of the effective articulation of social 
innovation policy agendas (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
A second feature of the typology is that it facilitates a granular analysis of the strategic tools 
employed at different socio-structural levels within the policy process (see Table 2). It also 
demonstrates how these tools relate to strategic objectives. For example, in terms of macro-level 
government policy to encourage social innovation, the strategic tools will primarily be regulation, 
fiscal policy, and direct commissioning or investment. The strategic objectives will relate to the 
successful implementation of desired policy outcomes. In contrast, for social innovation within the 
policy making process the strategic tools will be reform-based, typically around new commissioning 
practices such as the introduction of quasi-markets or outcomes based contracts. The strategic 
objectives will be the articulation of new policy discourses and frameworks as institutional ‘rules of 
the game’ that frame, shape and constrain the actions of government itself.  
 
Type Of Social 
Innovation  
Social Grid Referent Strategic Tools Strategic Objectives 
Policy For Social 
Innovation 
Institutions Regulation 
Fiscal Policy 
Direct Commissioning 
and Investment 
Policy Implementation and 
Outcomes 
Social Innovation 
Policy Making 
Institutions Reforms to 
Commissioning Practices 
Policy Discourses and Frameworks 
Social Dynamic 
Innovation 
Social Networks Hybridity 
Boundary Blurring  
New Market Structures 
Social Service 
Innovation 
Social Networks Innovative Public Goods 
(Outputs) 
New Social Relations 
(Process) 
New Markets 
Formal Social Change 
Innovation 
Cognitive Frames Advocacy and Protest Cognitive/Normative Frame Shifts 
Informal Social 
Change Innovation 
Cognitive Frames Collective Action Localized Solidarity and 
Mobilization 
Table 2: Strategic Processes In Social Innovation (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017) 
 
For social enterprises operating at the meso-level to shape and respond to market environments the 
strategic tools and objectives will also differ. Social enterprises engaged in social dynamic 
innovation often focus on boundary blurring activities by creating new hybrid organizations in order 
to achieve strategic objectives based on reshaping existing market structures. For example, micro-
credit represents a new, Bottom of the Pyramid, market that links the traditions of development aid to 
the commercial logics of retail lending and debt in hybrid market format. The consequence is both to 
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give access to finance to poorer borrowers and to reshape how capital markets conceive of the poor 
as customers – primarily by correcting inaccurate risk assumptions in terms of repayment rates. 
Social enterprises working on social service innovation, on the other hand, usually focus on strategic 
objectives that aim to create new markets within existing market structures. The strategic tools 
employed are often either the creation of innovative public goods (an outputs focus) or forming new 
social relations (a process focus). An example of the former is Project Impact that offers a new, low 
cost, foot-pump to improve irrigation and crop yields for the poorest farmers. An example of the 
latter is Fair Trade – a new model of the supply chain that passes more of the total value chain to the 
(poor) producer than in existing practice (Nicholls, 2017). 
Finally, at the micro- or grassroots level, organizations engaged in formal social change use the 
strategic tools of advocacy and protest to shift normative and cognitive frames around a key issue 
such as Climate Change to a new (in this case more sustainable) equilibrium. For informal social 
change organizations collective action offers a strategic tool by which to achieve strategic objectives 
around new localized solidarity and mobilization (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
An additional insight from this typology is that to achieve social innovation policy outcomes it may 
be necessary to achieve consensus and objective alignment across the three levels of action set out 
here.  But this has its hazards too. The multiple framing and pursuit of social innovation in public 
policy, makes it possible to encourage collective action for a particular outcome or activity, but this 
equally detracts from mobilizing resources and individuals against the structural determinants of 
exclusion. For example, if utility maximizing approaches – as enshrined in the dominant neo-liberal 
policy paradigm in the EU - are presented as complementary to, rather than in conflict with, more 
grassroots and radical approaches to social innovation, then this runs the risk of presenting both 
approaches as compatible or mutually conceivable. At a stroke this removes the potential of bottom-
up social innovation as a driver of policy reform disempowering many of the most marginalised 
communities (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
The typology above suggest that, on the contrary, the political subjectivity, local embeddedness, and 
collective action of marginalised groups may be a key resource for ensuring social innovation policy 
is able to tackle the structural determinants of marginalisation and, thereby, contribute towards 
systemic and ‘positive’ social change. This presents a particular challenge for public policy in trying 
to overcome the paradox of embedded agency that characterizes both institutional entrepreneurship 
and social innovation. As noted above, it requires, first, a process of self-reflection to recognize 
institutional dominance and, then, a process of reform to develop new participatory structures by 
which individuals at different socio-structural levels can engage meaningfully in policy development 
and implementation. This would be, of course, in itself a social innovation in policy making 
(Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
To achieve this, social innovation policy makers seeking to improve the human capabilities and 
empowerment of marginalised individuals would focus on fostering localized and collective action 
with measures that encourage self-organization. These measures would aim to develop individual 
and collective competencies (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). These would serve to recognize needs, 
and to advocate for change - out of the socio-structural position of marginalised communities. 
Concretely, this would lead to new mechanisms of participation and voice. Moreover, the typology 
of politics suggests that to foster systemic social innovation, public policy must go further not only to 
engender collective identification amongst marginalised individuals but also to identify how their 
individual disadvantages are shared and connected to broader regimes of production, consumption, 
inequality, welfare and power (Edmiston, 2016a; Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). This process brings 
in the meso-level of market analysis highlighted above and connects marginalised populations with 
market actors and structures that can mediate the socio-structural space between grassroots and 
government via social innovation (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
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In doing so, it would be possible to foster collective material and post-material transformations that 
effectively resource and politicise social innovation as a policy concept. This would advance a social 
innovation paradigm that entails collective action for measures that seek to fulfil human capabilities 
and social needs. However, it would also encourage measures that venerate and foster collective 
action against those institutions, networks and cognitive frames that structure social disadvantage. 
Without a policy approach that offers systemic solutions to overcoming marginality (through 
problematizing its structuration), social innovation policy runs the risk of being co-opted as another 
tool of oppression that distracts from, and thereby legitimizes persistent inequalities of resource, 
power and opportunity (Edmiston, 2016a; Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
 
4. Key actors: government, grass-root movements and fluid power 
structures 
 
The role of government can be seen to have varied over the lifecycle of the cases under analysis. A 
typical model of the development of public welfare programmes in the historical cases demonstrated 
the gradual nationalization of initially private welfare innovations and initiatives during the twentieth 
century reaching a high watermark of centralized command and control during the period of 
dominant liberal welfare states from around 1945-1975. This shift from private to public located 
social innovation experiments largely outside of government – the charitable or philanthropic sector 
acting as something of a ‘research and development’ operation for the state. The role of government, 
therefore, becomes to identify successful social innovation experiments and scale and institutionalize 
them, via public sector structures. The period of dominance of welfare states was then followed by an 
extended period of privatization and marketization as neo-liberal ideologies gain traction in key 
public policy discourses. This is the current status quo in EU policy discourses - with a range of 
problematic elements as noted above. Thus, a social innovation solution can be more or less market-
based at different points in time whilst the core social mission remains the same (Nicholls and 
Edmiston, 2017). 
For example, in the case of social housing in Germany, a historical analysis reveals five phases of 
development. Initially, private philanthropy drove early experiments in providing shelter and 
accommodation for the poor during a period of accelerated urbanization and industrialisation. These 
social innovations were then institutionalized by a growing number of municipalities from a private 
into a public social innovation. Subsequently, two major exogenous events – the Great Depression 
and World War Two – had a significant effect on the further growth and establishment of social 
housing models across Germany, effectively mainstreaming the social innovation often drawing on 
market-based solutions with public subsidies and being provided by a variety of different societal 
actors. However, following the rise of neo-liberalism, the fifth and most recent phase of development 
has seen a fragmentation of, and decline in, the provision of public social housing as processes of 
individualization and marketization come to dominate. The nested policy paradigms analysis above 
helps unpick these historical shifts and explains how some key discourses persisted whilst others 
waxed or waned (Scheuerle et al., 2015; Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
The historical case analysis implemented in CrESSI demonstrates that the more dominant policy 
paradigm in recent years across the EU has been a neo-liberal one. This perspective suggests that 
‘free’ markets are deemed to be the best allocators of both private and public goods, typically 
reducing in the process the scope of the state with regard to social provision. In this situation, the 
emergence of new ‘hybrid’ (private-public) models has offered a way forward for government. 
However, overall, the historic case analysis suggested that for social innovations to succeed over 
time and at scale, government participation is required in order to compensate for market failures that 
produce resource constraints, especially when there are high infrastructure investments such as in 
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social housing or clean water and sanitation (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
A final issue relates to how government functions as an articulator of ideology (see also below). For 
example, as social housing in Germany increasingly moved into public sector governance, social 
innovation solutions were subject to ideological influence and change. Both municipal and co-
operative social housing facilities were closely linked with major political groups, such as the trade 
unions, Social Democrats, Christian trade unions, or the Centre party. Each of these groups formed 
federal associations supporting and proselytizing for their own ideologically framed model of social 
housing.  
The long-term perspective of the historical case studies suggests that many social problems are never 
entirely solved, but, rather, re-emerge in different contexts and manifestations according to changing 
social needs and expectations. Thus, many social innovations - when examined over longer time 
scales - demonstrate continuous adaptation and improvement often by engaging with a range of 
different actors and loci of power and dominance at different points in the lifecycle. The 
interrelations and interactions of different actors around a social innovation often demonstrate fluid 
and shifting power structures and changes in institutional dominance. The historical perspective 
reveals many key social innovations to be the product of joint endeavours between a variety of actors 
in multiple inter-relating field positions over time (Scheuerle et al., 2016; Nicholls and Emiston, 
2017).  
In several cases, participatory models of engagement and co-production - such as when residents 
were given significant control over the design and management of new or refurbished social housing 
in Vienna - played an important role at different points in the evolution of social innovations. These 
empowerment strategies reflect a desire to get close to the end-user beneficiaries of a social 
innovation to ensure that design and development processes are fit for purpose. Moreover, 
democratic theory suggests that state authorities also cede power at times when playing the role of 
formally elected representatives - for example, municipal housing in Vienna aimed equally to 
represent the interests of the different groups of tenants according to age, gender, ethnicity and so on. 
In Lyon, there was an open consultation process with inhabitants of deprived areas where residents 
were asked for specific information about their living experience to inform planned improvements to 
social housing and neighbourhoods (Schimpf et al., 2017; Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
What it takes for social innovation to provoke systemic change 
 
There is increasing consensus that systemic change will not be driven by technology only but that it also 
depends on social innovation, which consequently impacts on capabilities and practices as well as on 
institutions, social networks and collective cognitive frames. Social housing in Europe not only brought 
people out of the slums, in which they had to live in during the early phases of industrialisation; but out of 
marginalisation in overall. The case of social housing in the early 20th century in Vienna can therefore serve 
as an example of systemic change. To underpin the elements of such change, three socio-structural levels can 
be distinguished, at which appropriate and effective solutions might be introduced through the social 
innovation process: 
(1) At the micro-level, solutions can aim at directly improving/changing human capabilities or social relations 
between individuals. (2) At the meso-level, solutions can aim at changing institutions, social networks and 
collective cognitive frames (i.e. the fabric of the social grid according to Beckert (2010)). Although such 
innovations are ‘only’ indirectly impacting human capabilities and social relations at the micro-level, when 
impacting on the social grid (institutions, social networks and cognitive frames), social innovations can have 
long-lasting effects, once path dependencies and lock-in effects have been overcome. (3) At the macro-level, 
solutions can aim at framework conditions leading to changes or triggering innovations at micro and meso-
level. These conditions can be of legislative nature including changes in constitutional right and laws which 
are reaching further than the social grid at meso-level. Policy measures at macro level will in most cases have 
even more durable effects than those taken at the meso-level as the decisions are harder to reverse.  
In the case of social housing in Vienna, this can ex post be identified as based on an orchestrated and 
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systematic policy design during the 1920s with durable impact on the situation of previously marginalised 
groups. Workers, coming from all regions of the Austrian empire, who were attracted by the economic boom 
at the turn of the 19th century, formed the most marginalised group. After WWI the working class in Vienna 
became part of society, meaning that in the sense of Mann and Cressi’s concept of power workers were 
empowered in terms of artefactual, political, cultural and economic power. This transformation was strongly 
supported through the social housing policy in Vienna and formed the fundament for further improvements for 
the working class after WW II.  
Selected examples of measures taken at different levels follow. At the micro-level: Training courses were 
provided by settlement co-operatives for unskilled workers and soldiers returning from war in order to reduce 
unemployment; In kind contributions to building houses “Muscle mortgage” were accepted instead of 
payment, which helped lower social classes to improve their living conditions; Job creation programs were 
implemented though communal housing in the construction of ‘super-blocks’ such as Karl-Marx-Hof, Goethe-
Hof etc; The social housing projects improved the quality of life of the dwellers by providing less humid 
living conditions, better air, running water and toilets. This also substantially improved sanitary and health 
conditions for the working class; Through large scale Communal Housing the status of dwellers improved 
significantly as people got out of the slums. 
At the meso-level: A network of libraries was established in the super-blocks all around Vienna. Building 
libraries provided the institutional support for less educated and low-income groups to access information and 
literature openly; Establishment of kinder gardens as day-care institutions for working class in 1920s in super-
blocks allowed women to enter the job market. Even modern education-concepts like Montessori were already 
applied in some cases; As architects became aware of the needs of working class without coming out of this 
class, they formed new alliances with the working class; Some 50 co-operatives emerge out of the settler’s 
movement representing more than 80 local groups; New social networks in the form of workers associations 
(Arbeitervereine) profited from the local proximity in the super-blocks. This helped in coordinating political 
activities and improves political influence. 
At the macro-level: The cognitive frame provided by feminism lead to the active and passive voting right for 
women in the First Austrian Republic (1918) and changed the composition of the sovereign; Constitutional 
rights and laws with an impact on individual capabilities for inclusion were introduced. Particularly the voting 
right for women lead to more emphasis on social issues in legislation at large; Legal reforms of building co-
operative law helped working class improve their inclusion and gain social acceptance. It primarily helped to 
get organised for housing projects, as well as to improvement of their bankability; The autonomy status for 
City of Vienna (1921), allowed the city government to set its own legislation in social policy. 
Looking back over more than one century, the systemic change which took place in cities like Vienna or 
Amsterdam with respect to social housing led to empowering the marginalised group of the working poor in 
early phases of the industrial revolution. What has been achieved particularly in the 1920s is impressive and 
changed the identity of individual people, the working class as a social group and the identity of the cities 
which are still shaped by the built-environment established in that time period. Learning from this historic 
case, the conclusion can be drawn that systemic social change requires changes at multiple levels (micro-, 
meso- and macro-level) and types of social and technological innovations as well as changes in the framework 
conditions enabling for these innovations. 
At micro-level social change can be achieved by innovations directly addressing and influencing the 
capabilities of marginalised individuals and social groups and provide them with appropriate technologies and 
infrastructures to make the change happen. Direct policy interventions would be to make resources available 
for social innovation providing better or cheaper access to technologies (e.g. frugal innovation) and to build 
infrastructures matching the needs of the marginalised (e.g. by applying the principles of user innovation). At 
meso-level social change can be achieved by innovations in elements of the social grid in which marginalised 
individuals and social groups are acting though changes in social networks, collective cognitive frames and 
institutions. Policy measures could focus at supporting marginalised groups in establishing working social 
networks and new alliances. Furthermore participatory forward looking processes could help in changing 
collective cognitive frames of the group of marginalised. This can help them in coordinated action and to build 
or transform institutions to better support their capabilities. At macro-level systemic change can be fostered by 
providing the framework conditions for innovation and empowerment at micro and meso-level. However, as 
this goes beyond the competences of social policy makers, a broader consensus within society and between 
political parties will be needed to change those framework conditions and rules of the game. Social policy 
makers might have to prepare themselves for windows of opportunity to shaping the broader framework 
conditions in alliance with actors in other policy fields. For social innovation policy making it is important to 
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highlight the importance of technological aspects and access to infrastructure. Both, technologies and 
infrastructure are usually built for and mainly available to the mainstream. As a consequence, they are often 
not accessible to marginalised groups. Social innovation policy should also target access to these, as those 
aspects are often shaped by technological innovation policy. 
[extracted and adapted from Kubeczko, Giesecke and Wagner, 2017: D4.4 Policy Brief] 
 
Of course, social innovations are also constrained by power structures despite concerted attempts by 
some actors to introduce more fluidity. Thus, in some situations, the extant structures of institutions, 
networks and cognitive frames can reproduce rather than mitigate against marginalisation (Nicholls 
and Edmiston, 2017). For example, for the historically marginalised Roma people in Europe - mainly 
in Central and Eastern Europe - there has been little success in seeking to change power relations. 
Indeed, the national authorities in Hungary have not been a neutral player aiming to reduce 
marginalisation problems, but rather have been responsible actors in the process of reproduction. As 
a consequence, to achieve success, social innovation must, at times, move from action in one 
political level to another. In the case of the Roma, this move would be from the national to the EU 
level in order to seek direct investment to end the social exclusion of the most marginalised. In this 
way, funds could reach the key actors supporting marginalised communities, bypassing the national 
and local administrations and the ideological agendas that continue to suppress the Roma (Ziegler et 
al. 2017).  
The historic case analysis also suggests that social innovation as disruptive change is very rare and 
tends to occur not as a consequence of innovation itself, but, rather, as a by-product of major societal 
realignments after epochal events such as wars, serious economic crises, political shocks, or major 
technological breakthroughs. This realization serves to moderate some of the hyperbole around 
disruptive social innovation as a stated policy or practice objective (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2017). 
 
 
5. No single, no easy solution: the winding roads of social innovation  
 
An important feature of social innovation processes that policymaking should keep in mind has to do 
with its typically decentralized nature: often, social innovations appear as ‘characterised by a 
multitude of small operators and initiatives rather than by a small number of big players (Terstriep et 
al., 2015: 80). CrESSI's investigation of historical case studies confirms that social innovations are 
typically not promoted by one, central actor, but that they instead depend on a complex multitude of 
actors that act in part independently, in part in complementary ways. 
Scheuerle et al. (2016) have investigated and compared the patterns with which social housing, the 
supply of freshwater and generalised access to education have emerged and consolidated across 
Europe. These historical examples of social innovations that have "made it" to institutionalization 
show that major social innovations often do not have a single starting point, but grow from different 
responses to a social need over time. These responses are influenced by different social forces and 
thus create diversity within the social innovation from the beginning: different solutions with 
different particularities emerge in different contexts. This contribution highlights the relevance of a 
multi-level approach to analysis since it suggests that many actors – potentially at different socio-
structural levels from government to the grassroots - will be involved in the long-term evolution of a 
social innovation. 
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In an in-depth case study on social housing in the city of Vienna, Giesecke finds that there is scope 
for multi-level analyses, also with reference to work by Geels and Shot (2007): 
The debate on transition towards holistic sustainability at the turn of the millennium gave rise to an 
understanding of innovation as a lifecycle, developed by Geels and Schot. It is connected to the 
terminology of ‘multi-level perspective’, meaning that transition is seen as an ‘outcome of 
alignments between developments at multiple levels’ (Geels and Schot, 2007). The multi-level 
perspective approach is meant as a heuristic concept distinguishing the three levels niche, regime 
and landscape. Here, multi-level does not stand for the policy levels region, nation, supra-nation. 
Rather, the heuristic approach describes the scope of an innovation: operating restricted to a niche 
market; is the scope of the innovation at the level of a socio-technical regime; and how do innovation 
activities react to the transformative pressure from the socio-technical landscape (Giesecke in 
Scheuerle et al., 2016, p. 238) 
Historical analysis also highlights that not all social innovations are "meant" for scaling up. Some of 
them remain a niche-solution. Others on the other hand find their way to convince more and more 
different segments of society: they start mainstreaming and typically succeed in engaging with the 
political environment at some point. When they engage with elements at the regime level, social 
innovations start a process of institutionalization, becoming themselves part of or contributing to the 
change of the existing regime. Historical analysis however also shows that changes in landscape, 
such as the constitution of the European Union, or World Wars can have profound influences on the 
life-cycle of social innovations, sometimes lifting them out of a niche, other times pushing them 
back, other times changing the way they are implemented. 
So, the analysis articulated in the Geels and Shot model highlights three levels of action as a pathway 
for the growth and institutionalization of innovation: niche; socio-technical regime; socio-technical 
landscape. Whilst these say nothing about power and politics they do reflect the same basic structure 
as the typology of politics previously outlined: namely micro, meso and macro. However, CrESSI 
research adds to this conceptualization by introducing agency and multi-directional action between 
levels (Nicholls, 2017). 
Overall, the historic case studies suggested that a range of actors were involved in the development 
of social innovations in a variety of different contexts and within a variety of ecosystem structures. 
At different socio-structural levels, different individuals, groups and social networks engaged with 
developing social innovations in continuous interplay with dynamic changes in institutions and 
cognitive frames. 
What historical analysis applying the ESGM does not automatically highlight is the specific 
dynamics in agency that single actors or groups enact to realize and promote social innovation. 
Agency, from the perspective of human capabilities is that ability to change one's environment, to 
have an influence on the surrounding world, in line with own values and goals. It therefore implies, 
at the very individual level, the ability of people to formulate own goals, first of all, and secondly, to 
enact them in a satisfying way. Historical analysis tends to show successes and processes, mostly, but 
less the individual micro cosmos within which goals, decisions and actions take place as ego-
documents of marginalised people rarely exist. 
For this reason, besides historical reconstructions of social innovations in the 19th and the beginning 
of the 20th century CrESSI has also empirically investigated current cases of social innovation, that 
allow capturing the perception of participants and therefore to gain insights on the role that social 
innovation may have in fostering agency.  
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For this scope, CrESSI has collected primary data on three social innovation cases in Europe; in 
particular, the research team explored the scope, organisation and possible impact of three social 
innovations:  
• complementary currencies in the Netherlands and the role they have in reducing 
marginalisation through greater access to credit or employment opportunities, in particular by 
promoting the local economy; 
• solidarity purchasing groups in Italy and their potential for reducing marginalisation of small-
scale, organic farmers and other producers that embed a solidarity-value in their products and 
services;  
• communal interest groups in rural and remote areas of Germany that seek self-determination 
in water provision and waste water management and the role that these groups can play for 
local empowerment. 
 
In order to gather comparable information across the three cases, a coordinated primary data 
collection used mixed methods, combining qualitative and more exploratory interviews with social 
innovators with more structured responses to a survey that gathered subjective opinions and 
perceptions of active participants and control groups. The data collection took place between October 
2015 and May 2016. 
As part of CrESSI’s multi-level theoretical framework, detailed attention was paid to capturing (1) 
subjective evaluations of agency and change that may be attributed to participation in the social 
innovation; (2) the role and importance of specific social forces such as institutions, cognitive frames 
and networks, for the implementation and success of the social innovation; (3) the possibility of 
singling out the social impact of the studied processes by using control groups. 
Results have shown that participants expect social innovations to change people's minds, altering 
cognitive frames, or mental structures, mainly. Participants further all reported that they have 
benefitted from social innovation, again mainly by acquiring intangible opportunities, such as new 
knowledge and social relations that have positive implications for their business (von Jacobi and 
Chiappero-Martinetti, 2017; von Jacobi et al, 2018). 
What the analysis of current cases does not provide is that long-term breadth of historical cases. For 
this reason, impact of social innovations that are still on going are often unclear and maybe - to the 
eye of evidence-based policymaking - insufficient. Yet, how should concrete evidence be gained and 
measured on a process that is changing the way that people think? How should we quantify the gains 
from a new social contact that brings with it horizontal sharing of knowledge, or maybe just imitation 
of behaviours? Yet, CrESSI seems to get to the conclusion that these processes are of crucial 
importance, and probably the beginning of what could be called social change. If social innovation is 
acknowledged to having transformative potential, policymaking needs to be aware of its intangible 
effects and consider the possibility of "leaps of faith" in which support and investment goes beyond 
neatly quantifiable outcomes and impacts in the short-term. Yet, this should recall the need for 
politicising social innovation more: if politics is to promote long-term visions of social change, these 
are bound to having political meaning. 
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What social innovation policy can learn from business innovation policy 
 
Social innovation policy, if considered as a separate policy field, could profit from the long tradition of 
innovation policy applied to fostering business innovation and technological development. This relates to the 
understanding of the functions and failures of innovation (eco-) systems (actors, networks, institutional rules 
of the game, etc.), and the importance of getting users and customers engaged in the innovation process (user-
led innovation). Policy instruments (e.g. competence centres, living labs, etc.) might be adapted to the social 
innovation context. Also, methods and tools for policy advice developed to support science, technology, and 
innovation [STI]-policy makers (e.g. foresight, horizon scanning, social network analysis, etc.) could be of use 
in social innovation policy design and counselling. When trying to learn from business innovation policy, two 
key issues should be kept in mind: (1) The implementation of novel technology embedded within a new (or 
significantly improved) good or service provided on a market; or the implementation of process innovation as 
a new or significantly improved production or delivery method per se cannot be seen as a success criterion for 
innovativeness in the case of social innovation, unless it serves the intended policy aim, which usually refers 
to some kind of social need. (2) As in the context of business innovation policy, invention should not be 
confused with innovation. Social innovation policy measures should be designed in a way that allows ideas or 
inventions (which might even be new to the world) to materialise through the social innovation process, thus 
leading to the successful implementation and diffusion of social innovation.  
 
When considering social innovation as a sub-field of STI policy, it must be noted that evidence and concepts 
created over the last years in the mainstream of research on business innovation focussed either on the 
average-customers or the most visible sectors and regions (e.g. ICT and Silicon Valley). Thus, the prevalent 
conceptual frameworks and analytical tools have a blind spot when economic benefits cannot be expected and 
“frugal innovation”, which aims at solutions for economically less favoured customers is only an emerging 
research field. What should be highlighted and acknowledged is that technology plays an important role in 
social innovations (though not necessarily new technological developments might be triggering the innovation 
process). A new trend seems to be emerging, namely that technology is adapted to the needs of the users of 
social innovation. When turning around the perspective, namely when attempting to fit business innovation 
studies to the needs of social innovation analysis and policy-making, it should be kept in mind that the 
definitions provided by the OECD in the Oslo Manual on business product/process/organisational innovation 
are not transposable to social innovation for the marginalised - as investigated in CrESSI - unless the criteria 
for successful implementation of the social innovation becomes the same as in business innovation, i.e. the 
creation of economic value for the marginalised group. 
[extracted and adapted from Kubeczko, 2016: D4.2 Policy Brief] 
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PART 2 - Current Policy Shortcomings 
 
From a detailed analysis of European policy documents (cf. Edmiston, 2015) it is clear that social 
innovation is a key strategic and policy interest for the European Union. Particularly since 2008, 
there has been a notable shift in how the European Union conceptualises societal challenges and the 
potential role of different private and public actors in meeting social and economic needs. Across the 
dominant EU policy frameworks, social innovation is repeatedly cited as a means and end to meeting 
social needs within the context of resource scarcity. From this it is clear, the European Union and its 
attendant administrative bodies have championed the potential for actors and organisations engaged 
in social innovation to strengthen the social dimensions of the economic and monetary union 
(European Commission, 2013d). However, in a number of important respects, there is a fissure 
between the ideals and high-level strategies articulated by the European Union and the policy 
instruments and mechanisms by which public authorities have attempted to foster social innovation 
(Edmiston, 2015). 
From the perspective of practitioners: the limits to ideals 
 
On 20th June 2016, CRESSI partners at the University of Tampere facilitated a practitioner seminar on social 
innovations fostered through the Finnish PAAVO housing programmes, which seek to tackle long-term 
homelessness. Delegates attending the event represented civil servants from various departments of the City of 
Tampere, companies that provide social housing services, and various third sector organisations. A total of 19 
people participated in the seminar. Several delegates raised the issue of heterogeneity amongst the long-term 
homeless in need of social housing services. This leads to the question, how the housing first principle should 
be defined and used when providing and planning services for different groups of homeless people. In 
everyday social work it is a challenge to recognise the special needs of each customer. There is also more than 
one form of providing housing: it makes a difference if the person is living in a housing unit, where the 
services are available locally, and if the customer is in a single flat or is dependent on floating social services. 
Currently both the Housing First model and the so-called Staircase Model are in use, because they are both 
instrumental depending on the situation and housing needs of the customer in each case. It was concluded that 
these two models are both needed and this should be accepted for the sake of the functionality of the whole 
housing service system and it would be unwise to think, that some new arrangement could replace the whole 
system altogether.  
Many participants expressed concern regarding the scale and depth of problems in finding solutions to people 
who have a long history of insecure housing. Some of these problems are very pragmatic and are the result of 
structural circumstances. For example, within the Finnish context many services are mainly available on-line 
and in order to have access to these, one needs to have a strong electronic identification. Usually online bank 
identifiers are used for this purpose. The problem for long-term homeless people is that banks are not willing 
to have them as their customers due to their history of financial difficulties and as a result of this, they don't 
have access to online bank identifiers. Another difficulty encountered is the challenge of building trust with 
customers and finding ways to increase their commitment to the housing and support service system. In the 
discussion, a number of examples were drawn upon to illustrate discrepancies between the ideals of social 
work and everyday practice. The current ideology in social work emphasises the respect for the customer's 
freedom of choice, and the difficulty in the practice of social work is finding the ways to support customers to 
make reasonable choices in their lives. Also the current ideology in social work advices to give more 
responsibility to customers, but sometimes they are given responsibility for matters they have difficulties 
managing, such as paying rent on time.  
The current system of public procurement in arranging housing and social services for the long-term homeless 
stimulated much debate. It was evident that recent changes have caused concern about the future of the social 
housing service system amongst service providers. This was often expressed by emphasising the need to retain 
high quality services and that price should not be the only or most central criteria in making decisions on new 
contracts. Delegates also remarked on the importance of trust between different actors and clients in the whole 
system of housing support and service provision. High standard service models are made from a wide range of 
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services and many organisations that provide these services. It takes a significant amount of time and 
networking to create well-working co-operation in this service field. It was also noted that changes in making 
service contracts also encourages actors to seek new relations of co-operation. On this basis, different 
stakeholders have a renewed and vested interest in becoming acquainted and co-ordinating their activities and 
services with one another. 
[extracted and adapted from Aro, 2016: CrESSI Practitioner Seminar Summary on 'Social Innovations in 
PAAVO housing programmes in Finland 2008-2015'] 
	
 
6. From short-term welfare programmes to long-term strategies for 
social change 
 
Constraints on public expenditure have challenged the state’s capacity to respond to and address 
social problems. Within this context, social innovation has regularly been cited as a means ‘to do and 
achieve more with less’ (TEPSIE, 2014). This in part reflects a crisis with mature capitalist 
economies and the response from traditional welfare systems (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Endogenous 
and exogenous factors are propagating old social problems, as well as creating new social risks. 
Demographic and familial change, socio-economic globalisation and structural underemployment are 
bearing down on public finances and challenging the state’s capacity to respond to these phenomena 
(Caulier-Grice et al., 2012). Many have suggested that a reconsideration of how welfare is financed 
and delivered is needed with some turning to consider the promises of the social economy and social 
investment as a policy response. Paradigmatically, rising interest in social innovation reflects a 
recognition that old or institutionalised policy responses inadequately address the distinct but integral 
domestic shifts and international challenges facing EU member states (Chen et al., 2014). Some have 
argued that social innovation, in its various permutations, is symptomatic of a ‘neoliberal orthodoxy’, 
dissimulating political choices and legitimated budgetary constraints’ (Grisolia and Ferragina, 2015: 
167). Such academic and political commentators have suggested that social innovation represents a 
marked withdrawal of the state from social welfare and a liberalisation of need provision and social 
assistance (Edmiston, 2015:1-2). In spite of its promises, many have argued that social innovation, 
both conceptually and in its implementation, obscures the structural determinants of social and 
economic problems (Grisolia and Ferragina, 2015; von Jacobi, Edmiston and Ziegler, 2017).  
Others are less critical of social innovation and suggest that its privileged position in EU 
policymaking at present demonstrates a profound disaffection with the ‘neoliberal’ policies 
implemented over the course of the last three decades in the European Union. The liberalisation and 
deregulation of welfare functions and services have, in many instances, not had the desired effects 
that were expected. This has brought into question the capacity of the free market economy to meet 
both social and economic needs (Edmiston, 2015). It has been suggested that this ‘crisis of 
capitalism’ has induced political administrations to look for alternative models of production and 
consumption – not only within the welfare sector but also the private sector (Langergaard, 2014; 
Green and Hay, 2015). According to this interpretation, the prominence of social innovation 
represents an increasing appreciation for the structural causes of inequality and social problems. As 
Borzaga and Bodini (2014: 411) note, ‘the ensuing quagmire has left policymakers looking for new 
solutions that can enable them to tackle growing social problems with dwindling resources’. On the 
other hand, social innovation often brings with it a plurality of modes of providing goods that 
challenge the 'monotheism' of the free market as sole provider of goods and services (Ziegler and von 
Jacobi, 2018). New alliances, partnerships and divisions of responsibilities and tasks can often 
challenge 'market fundamentalism". Among those that adopt this perspective, many point to the 
speculative potential of social innovation in tackling old and new social problems in an 
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unconstrained and transformative manner. 
The large range of possible interpretations of the scope and best 'use' of social innovation is largely 
dependent on the fact that definitions of social innovation are vague. "Some argue that social 
innovation is defined by its process, methods and socio-structural function; others define social 
innovation according to preceding approaches and organisational forms; whilst others believe social 
innovation is characterised by its outcomes and objectives" (Edmiston, 2015:6). Many of the most 
influential definitions conflate these different dimensions to describe the essence of social 
innovation. Very often however, it is less clear which characteristics (or even outcomes) are 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions. With its character so loosely and inconsistently defined, social 
innovation can be understood as: ‘a hybrid, making use of empirical analysis and thereby deploying 
scientific methods, but simultaneously having an indeterminate quality, making it adaptable to a 
variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twists and turns of policy’ (Jenson, 2012). 
However, this bi-partisan, cross-sectoral interest in social innovation does not necessarily reflect an 
abuse or re-alignment of values practices and interests. Rather, it may well be that the indefinite 
character of social innovation is able to accommodate a plurality of applications and motivations.  
A secondary effect that the polysemic nature of social innovation has, however, is that it is hard to 
identify the phenomenon and impact of social innovation, no matter whose initiative is to be 
evaluated. For this reason it is also hard to evaluate the impact of social innovation policies and hold 
public authorities, organisations and actors accountable when allocating resources or funding. An 
ostensible claim to be social or innovative does not necessarily count as such. There is a danger that 
false definitions, ideals and descriptions are superimposed onto a phenomenon or initiative with 
markedly different origins and motivations. A measurable impact of a state intervention could be 
construed or presented as social innovation to obscure underlying policy objectives. Equally, social 
innovation may be supported through policy instruments and agendas in ways that are neither 
recognised nor intended (Edmiston, 2015:7).  
The more a perspective is adopted in which social innovation is conceived of as driver of long-term 
change, the more it becomes difficult to fully account for effects and monitoring them. Social change 
is a complex, multi-levelled, multi-layered phenomenon that requires many slow-moving social 
structures to change. As empirical findings suggest, social innovation has in fact the potential to be 
triggering such change, as it seems to mainly address cognitive frames and social relationships (von 
Jacobi and Chiappero-Martinetti, 2017). These however are intangible and hard to measure or 
quantify. Furthermore, changes in the way people think only slowly materialize, first in modified 
attitudes, then in behaviours (Dhondt and Weber, 2017). Until these behaviours reach the necessary 
diffusion and breadth to form new organisations - and eventually, institutions - this takes other time. 
For this reason, the finite (if any of such processes can be considered as finite at any moment in time) 
effects become visible only after considerable time and it is typically impossible to foresee the exact 
time-frame by when this may occur. The intrinsic difficulties to properly assess effects and 
composite impact on social change of a given social innovation initiative may constitute a real 
obstacle for policy makers that are inclined to conceive of social innovation as a long-term strategy 
for social change instead of a means to implement short-term welfare programmes.  
A neat distinction between these two perspective, however, seems to be difficult to combine with the 
mechanics of policy-making. Compare this with Edmiston (2015:8) resuming how social innovation 
as welfare substitute still maintains a deep link to social change, especially when it comes to tackling 
big societal challenges: "In a recent report prepared by the DG Regional and Urban Policy and the 
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, there was broad recognition that growing interest in 
social innovation was intimately linked to the Great Recession, structural unemployment and the 
social challenges arising as a result (European Commission, 2014b).  
In political and policy rhetoric, the European Union repeatedly cites social innovation as a solution to 
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the persistence of socio-economic, environmental and demographic challenges. The European Union 
and its attendant public authorities emphasise that these challenges are placing increasing pressure on 
Europe’s systems of welfare, health, education and care provision. Budgetary constraints and 
increased demand on public services has fuelled the desire to capitalise on social innovation so that 
public and private actors are able to do and achieve more with less (TEPSIE, 2014). Not only is 
social innovation understood as a means to achieve an end in this regard, it is also recognised as an 
end in itself." Accordingly, it has dealt with the vagueness of social innovation definitions in a 
cautious way, mainly in order to possibly accommodate as much 'plurality' as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BEPA (2010a) 
In its earlier stages, the EC was reluctant to commit to one definition because it was believed that 
‘social innovation, as a new and emerging concept, cannot be encapsulated within a tight definition 
with strictly designated, objectives and means’ (BEPA, 2010a: 30). The Bureau of European Policy 
Advisers argued that there were a number of facets to social innovation that needed to be attended to 
or accommodated within a common working definition employed by the European Union: According 
to BEPA, the objectives of social innovation reported in the box are not mutually exclusive. With 
reference to the analytical framework introduced in part I, it seems advisable to separate out short-
term from long-term effects and to adopt a credible commitment to the long-term impacts of social 
innovation, while rationalizing the kind of monitoring that can be reasonably implemented within the 
short- and medium term (Nicholls, von Jacobi, Chiappero-Martinetti, Mildenberger and Kubeczko, 
2017). 
Social innovation policy is necessarily context- and time- specific 
 
Among other research strands, CrESSI has focused on a detailed examination and comparison of domestic 
social innovation policy agendas tackling marginalisation in Finland, Hungary and the UK, specifically, the 
PAAVO housing programme in Finland, Social Impact Bonds in the UK and social co-operatives in Hungary. 
Some key insights of this exercise are reported here. With different varieties of welfare capitalism, (social and 
public sector) innovation eco-systems, and varying degrees of marginalisation, an examination of one 
particular policy programme or instrument in each of the three countries has made it possible to: (1) explore 
by what processes individual member states develop distinctive policy agendas for social innovation; (2) 
understand how social innovation policy reflects wider social structures and power relations within member 
states and across states; (3) identify where institutional dominance (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) lies within 
and across member states in social innovation policymaking. These aspects shape for example the role and 
value of social innovation policies with respect to their capacity to develop partnerships, networks and finance 
for social innovation that improve human capabilities of marginalised populations across Europe. From the 
analysis undertaken, it is clear that social innovation policy, including its origins, operation and effects, is 
contextually and historically contingent. The contested policy concept of social innovation, invariably 
intersects with established institutional frameworks that mediate its significance, salience and efficacy in 
mobilising resource and action to tackle marginalisation. The diverse ways in which social innovation has 
been conceived and supported is subject to an ‘historically constructed set of institutional constraints and 
policy feedbacks that structure the behaviour of political actors and interest groups during the policymaking 
Social Innovation relates to the development of new forms of organisation and interactions to respond to 
social issues (the process dimension). It aims at addressing (the outcome dimension):  
1. Social demands that are traditionally not addressed by the market or existing institutions and are 
directed towards vulnerable groups in society.  
2. Societal challenges in which the boundary between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ blurs, and which are 
directed towards society as a whole.  
3. The need to reform society in the direction of a more participative arena where empowerment and 
learning are sources and outcomes of well-being.  
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process’ (Béland, 2005: 1). Viewed through the theoretical lens of historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 
1996), it is possible to identify the amalgam of ideational mechanisms, socio-economic and political structures 
within which social innovation policy is embedded. Historical institutionalism ‘views the polity as the primary 
locus for action, yet understands political activities, whether carried by politicians or by social groups, as 
conditioned by institutional configurations of governments and political party systems’ (Skocpol, 1992: 41). 
With that in mind, there are inevitable limitations and challenges in terms of identifying ‘best practice’ and 
transferability across heterogeneous socio-economic contexts. Finland, as a hybrid market economy, has a 
relatively high level of decommodification and low levels of social stratification and marginalisation. With a 
high budget surplus and strong track record of investment in (public sector) innovation, the Finnish context 
represents a potentially conducive environment for the policy motif of social innovation. Examination of the 
PAAVO housing programme suggests it was a relative ‘success’ in terms of financing and fostering 
innovative solutions and services to tackle long-term homelessness. As an example of a centrally supported 
and financed initiative, the PAAVO housing programme was able to create effective networks and public-
private partnerships that exemplify a social democratic interpretation of social innovation in public policy-
making. 
By contrast, the UK political administration has pursued and framed social innovation as an alternative policy 
approach and solution in rather different ways. With high levels of public sector debt, disinvestment in public 
and social services has been justified through institutional (Scott, 2001) and rhetorical logics of resource 
scarcity. Against this backdrop, social innovation has received a privileged political and policy position as a 
means through which to leverage private social investment to deliver costly welfare services, but also instigate 
innovative welfare interventions that mitigate against the risks of service failure, improve social outcomes and 
save public money. SIBs have been drawn upon as one such mechanism through which to achieve these aims 
and these can be seen as symptomatic of a liberal market economy and welfare regime. 
As a transition market economy, Hungary has undergone (and is still undergoing) substantial social, 
economic and political transformations. As a result, the Hungarian government has tended to interpret and 
support social innovation in ways that formally coheres with EU policy frameworks and financing 
programmes, but in actuality pursues rather different goals. As a public policy agenda, Hungarian support for 
social innovation has principally been motivated by a need to address high levels of structural unemployment 
and social exclusion. The introduction of ‘new type’ social co-operatives has undermined the democratic and 
co-operative potential of some social economy organisations in Hungary. In many respects, this can be seen as 
characteristic of an eco-system that lacks the policy infrastructure and domestic socio-economic and cultural 
conditions to foster social innovation without corrupting its integrity. These conditions have deteriorated as 
the result of a political and policy climate in Hungary that has, in many respects, undermined democratic 
accountability and due process, aggravated social conditions and misused and misappropriated EU funds. 
Invariably ‘new ideas and solutions’, or at least the motivations behind them, are not conceptually pure. 
Arguably, the features of social innovation are a transmutation of (or indeed, against) previous approaches and 
paradigms. Within any setting, this transmutation is instigated by certain socio-economic, cognitive and 
institutional processes. Whilst many EU member states have observed conditions similar to those outlined 
above; their particular configuration within different domestic contexts has given rise to a plurality of social 
innovation policy agendas that are relatively distinctive. 
[extracted and adapted from Edmiston and Aro (2016): D6.5 Public Policy, Social Innovation and 
Marginalisation in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Three Cases] 
	
7. Why not to focus only on employment: from social innovation as 
means to social innovation as end  
 
Alongside a series of other factors of disadvantage, the European Commission argues that 
‘unemployment is the main cause of poverty for the work-age population’ (European Commission, 
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2010: 4). Invariably, this informs Europe 2020’s overall strategy for tackling marginalisation but also 
how the European Union views the role of social innovation in this process (Edmiston, 2015:10): 
'the fight against poverty and social exclusion needs to rely on growth and 
employment as well as on modern and effective social protection. 
Moreover, innovative social protection intervention must be combined with 
a broad set of social policies including targeted education, social care, 
housing, health, reconciliation, and family policies, all areas where welfare 
systems have so far tended to intervene with residual programmes' 
(European Commission, 2010: 5). 
 
At least 20 per cent of the European Social Fund running from 2014 to 2020 has been allocated 
towards promoting social inclusion to ensure ‘people in difficulties and those from disadvantaged 
groups’ receive the same opportunities as others to integrate into society. The European Social Fund 
views social innovation as a key mechanism by which to tackle marginalisation. The regulations 
surrounding the European Social Fund state that it will commit to the ‘promotion of a high level of 
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a 
high level of education, training and protection of human health’ (European Commission, 2013c: 
470). Having said that, tackling marginalisation is principally understood as an activity focused on 
the (re-) employment and activation of marginalised groups (Edmiston, 2015:25). This however, 
stands in contrast with the definition of social innovation that the European Commission itself 
proposes, defining it as: 
'the development and implementation of new ideas (products, services and 
models) to meet social needs and create new social relationships or 
collaborations. It represents new responses to pressing social demands, 
which affect the process of social interactions. It is aimed at improving 
human well-being. Social innovations are innovations that are social in 
both their ends and their means. They are innovations that are not only 
good for society but also enhance individuals’ capacity to act' (European 
Commission, 2013a: 6). 
 
While this definition allows for a treatment of social innovation as both, means and ends, it seems as 
if the concrete implementation of initiatives in support of social innovation had not yet been able to 
live up to this definition. For example, the European Union emphasises the value and potential of the 
third function of the welfare state: social investment. As a response to the economic crisis, European 
Parliament came to a resolution on the Social Investment Pact in 2012. Launched in 2013, the Social 
Investment Package is an integrated framework designed to help European public authorities 
modernise and reform their social and public services. The initiative encourages member states to 
‘use their social budgets more efficiently and more effectively and to tackle the social consequences 
of the crisis by identifying best practices and providing guidance on the use of EU funds for social 
investment’ (European Commission, 2013c: 3).  
Rather than reactionary state intervention focused on alleviating social or economic challenges, the 
European Commission argues that public policies and finances should focus more on preventative 
measures and actions (Edmiston, 2015:18). This would be in line with CrESSI's framework 
according to which social innovation that tackles marginalisation needs to address those structural 
drivers that represent the root causes of (re)production of social disadvantage (von Jacobi, Edmiston 
and Ziegler, 2017). Yet, as part of the strategy mentioned, the European Commission claims that 
member states should be investing in people or ‘human capital’, so that public authorities are able to 
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reap the maximum social and economic ‘dividends’ on their social investment. Implementation of the 
Social Investment Package includes measures to tackle childhood inequality, improve the 
sustainability and provision of healthcare, enhance personalised social services, tackle gender 
inequality, modernise pension systems, reduce poverty and improve employment and activation 
services (European Commission, 2014a).  
Whilst old and new social risks are recognised as an ethical, social and economic problem, these 
social risks are principally framed as a threat to the sustainability of EU welfare regimes and 
understood as functionally disruptive (European Commission, 2015). The Social Investment Package 
is seen as a key strategy to making the best use of limited financial resources to tackle growing 
poverty and social exclusion (European Commission, 2013b). The ambition to move from a ‘welfare 
state model’ to a ‘social investment state model’ is understood as a key means by which to cope with 
macroeconomic shifts, demographic changes, globalisation, as well as old and new social risks that 
bear down on public finances (European Commission, 2013e).  
According to the Social Investment Package ‘social innovation (and social policy experimentation), 
need to be embedded in mainstream policymaking and connected to social priorities’ (European 
Commission, 2014b: 72). The package informs member states’ policy reforms in the framework of 
the European Semester. The performance of member states is monitored through indicators 
underpinning the employment and poverty targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. As Edmiston (2015) 
points out, the reforms set out in the Social Investment Package are wide-ranging and centre on the 
social dimensions of the European Semester. Member states are encouraged to: 
• improve targeting of social policies to ensure those most in need of support or assistance 
receive it whilst reducing fiscal burden;  
• develop strategies for social innovation through public-private-third sector partnerships; 
• ensure adequate and predictable financial support including innovative ways of securing 
additional private financing for social investment;  
• simplify the administration of social security and protection to reduce fraud and increase 
benefit take up; 
• improve tax revenue collection and broaden tax bases in a growth-friendly manner that 
doesn’t compromise labour demand. 
Member states are expected to realise these objectives by making use of EU financial and non-
financial support services for social policy experimentation, testing new approaches to social policies 
and scaling the most effective innovations, exchanging experiences and expertise and exploring new 
financing mechanisms such as Social Impact Bonds. Ostensibly, these measures already have come 
some way to introducing new objectives, procedures and tools into the social policymaking process 
(Edmiston, 2015:18). Crucially, the social investment approach focuses on methods of activation that 
centre on individual solutions and interventions to socio-structural causes of marginalisation and 
resource scarcity. Indeed, a great deal of the social investment package focuses on reforming public 
services and social policies in a way that better equips people with the knowledge, skills, resilience 
and resources to adapt to social risks. This end goal of ‘adaptation’ is particularly interesting given 
the European Commission’s focus on the structural factors propagating marginalisation and resource 
scarcity (European Commission, 2013e). 
Rather than addressing the structural causes of social exclusion, the social investment package 
advocates for a ‘preventative’ strategy based on ‘activating and enabling policies’ that improve social 
inclusion through access to the labour market. The Social Investment Package seeks to: 
'invest in our human capital, from cradle to old age. Building upon people’s 
professional and social skills, and ensuring they have an opportunity to apply 
them in the labour market is an investment we need to make. It is what social 
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investment is about' (European Commission, 2013b: 3). 
Whilst this investment in human capital is believed to ‘strengthen people’s current and future 
capacities’ (European Commission, 2013e: 3), the nature of these capacities is largely pre-defined 
and prescribed by the European Union, in particular being centred on the ability to remain productive 
on the labour market. Rather than enabling individuals to define and realise their own interests and 
preferences as a means through which to overcome marginalisation, the social investment approach 
championed by the European Union encourages social and labour market integration as the key 
mechanism by which to tackle poverty, inequality and social exclusion.  
The example just outlined of the social investment approach to ‘human capital’ and ‘capacities’ is 
particularly significant because it focuses on social innovation as a means to overcoming 
marginalisation. Rather than affecting the process of social interactions (European Commission, 
2013a), the social investment approach requires those experiencing marginalisation to overcome 
structural barriers, participate within the labour market, integrate and operate within the existing 
institutions that however co-structure marginalisation (Edmiston, 2015). Such centrality of work and 
training to the EU social inclusion strategy is further demonstrable through slogans such as ‘more 
jobs, less marginalisation’, ‘give people skills not benefits’ and ‘supporting people to support 
business’. The European Social Fund views employment as ‘the most effective way of giving people 
independence, financial security and a sense of belonging’. The European Social Fund focuses on 
investments that help individuals adapt to a ‘rapidly changing job market’. In line with the Social 
Investment Package, these solutions to poverty, inequality and structural unemployment centre on 
‘re-training’, ‘re-skilling’ and ‘up-skilling’ disadvantaged, unemployed or young people. 
Consequently, such funds to tackle marginalisation are principally used to facilitate the integration of 
individuals into the existing economic paradigm and system of production and consumption 
(Edmiston, 2015). Thus, the European Social Fund aims to capitalise on innovative ideas, methods 
and services mainly to enhance the efficacy of employment assistance and activation services: 
‘promoting social entrepreneurship and vocational integration in social enterprises and the social and 
solidarity economy in order to facilitate access to employment’ (European Commission, 2013c: 475). 
Such an approach may mitigate the phenomenon of marginalisation in terms of one specific 
dimension, namely employment and - possibly - income, but it is unlikely to dismantle the social 
process through which marginalisation emerges and is being reproduced. For this reason, it does not 
appear to be an efficient approach in the long term. Furthermore, the compensatory effect of 
mitigating marginalisation without uprooting its causes implies the systemic confirmation of power 
structures that are systematically producing inequality in society. This is likely to trigger potentially 
dangerous unintended effects such as the spread of mistrust in institutions. More open approaches 
that truly allow for co-designing of objectives by citizens on the other hand, bear the potential of 
opening new channels of communication and collaboration between institutions and citizens that can 
foster trust, democratic participation and social cohesion. Particularly in view of big future societal 
challenges it seems crucial to avoid the perpetuation of cleavages between technocrats in institutions 
and marginalised citizens. 
How stakeholders perceive social innovation policy evaluation 
 
On 6th May 2015, CRESSI partners at the University of Oxford hosted a seminar on EU level social policy, 
hosted at the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (Nesta) in Central London, UK. The 
seminar was well attended by academics, practitioners, independent consultants and representatives from think 
tanks and umbrella body organisations. The discussion that emerged after engaging with CrESSI's research 
focus and programme is synthesized in the following four key issues: 
(1) The definition of social innovation employed by the European Commission is both useful and problematic. 
The vagueness of the concept makes it possible to support activities and organisations that extend well beyond 
the dominant paradigm of ‘doing and thinking’. Prescriptive definitions or metrics designed to assess the 
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impact of social innovation policy agendas can stifle creativity and dynamism. Equally, bound classifications 
may make certain activities and organisations ineligible for assistance or support. Conversely, vagueness 
makes it difficult to identify (let alone assess) social innovation and policies designed to support it. This is a 
challenge faced by academics and policymakers alike. To illustrate this point, one delegate mentioned that 
there are ‘social innovation champions’ within domestic ministries but often, these actors are not entirely clear 
about how, specifically, they are expected to foster social innovation.  
(2) The definition of social innovation employed by public institutions has significant repercussions for 
measuring success and impact. In this regard, measurement and impact were recurring themes. Social value 
and social return on investment were understood to be benchmarks of progress. A number of delegates raised 
questions about how to conceive of social innovation within the context of domestic and EU policymaking. 
For example, delegates encouraged to consider how it may be possible to measure and capture the impact of 
social innovation policy when it is not always nominally recognised as such? Further, how can policy findings 
and recommendations be made tractable with domestic, departmental and pan-European strategies in this 
regard? There was further some discussion about accounting for positive and negative externalities during the 
assessment of social innovation policies, programmes and activities.  
(3) With regard to exploring the effects of policy implementation, delegates encouraged to consider carefully 
units and areas of analysis. Specifically, to consider whether the focus of analysis should be on instances of 
‘success’ or ‘failure’ to establish the effects of public policy agendas. In addition, there was a reminder of the 
tendency to conflate social innovation and social entrepreneurship at the political and policy level. To evade 
this problem, one delegate suggested establishing a clear rationale for case selection in the organisations and 
activities that become object of analysis or evaluation. That is, a rationale that extends beyond existing 
confines to capture social innovation within and across a diverse range of organisations in a comparative 
context. 
(4) The question of accountability was another recurring theme. Delegates discussed how to ensure public 
funds are spent effectively by auditing activities, organisations and public authorities. Many were mindful of 
the challenges and costs associated with doing this. Some felt that ‘quantification is reduction’, whilst others 
suggested it was more a matter of effectively capturing the ‘market value’ of activities. These points lead to a 
broader discussion about the challenge of developing a social investment market and the obstacles facing 
social innovation funding and finance. 
[extracted and adapted from Edmiston and Nicholls, 2015: D6.2 EU level policy seminar on 'EU Public 
Policy, Social Innovation and Marginalisation: Reconciling ambitions with policy instruments'] 
 
 
8. Insufficient intellectual space: the need for courage to alter 
structural factors  
 
As previously introduced, social innovation policy faces a large spectrum of possibilities and a 
variety of different foci through which it can channel support for it. To the degree that social 
innovation is being seen as driver of social change, policy support will gradually have to widen up 
from targeted, short term goals to more horizontal, long-term mechanisms that also directly address 
structural factors that constitute the social process through which marginalisation is being 
(re)produced (von Jacobi, Edmiston and Ziegler, 2017). Yet, structural factors are deeply intertwined 
and co-evolving with power dynamics. For this reason, the particular equilibrium existing between 
social forces (cognitive frames, social networks, institutions) at a given time in a given context can 
be interpreted as institutional dominance, or the institutional status quo (von Jacobi and Nicholls, 
2017a). Consequently, the paradox of challenging institutional dominance out of which social 
innovation policies emerge is of relevance.  
First, the potential of social innovation to unfold and to effectively address/redress marginalisation is 
contingent on existing power relations enshrined in a given equilibrium between social forces (von 
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Jacobi et al., 2018): to some extent, successful social innovation necessarily needs to induce 
institutional change and therefore represents a threat to the current institutional dominance. This 
however necessarily raises questions about the relationship between power, marginalisation and 
social innovation. For example, who decides the policy priorities and strategic framework of the 
European Union? How do institutions govern the behaviour and outcomes of European citizens, and 
in particular of those that are marginalised? Who controls common or shared ways of thinking? What 
role can national and trans-national social networks play in instigating a realignment of power when 
they are concurrently subject to power relations? (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015a) 
The transference of power from the powerful to the powerless can help ensure that social innovations 
are enacted, but more importantly, that these are implemented in a way that maximally benefits the 
most disempowered citizens in Europe. Accordingly, if social innovation and innovative social 
policies intend to tackle marginalisation through structural change, it is necessary to take account of, 
and where possible address, the power imbalances that exist at the individual, collective and 
institutional level (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015a). 
One aspect of such transference of power may again imply greater openness to ideas and values that 
emerge among citizens and their absorption into policy making. The inclusion of such values is 
intrinsic in the notion - and goal - of social innovation to be improving capabilities, as these resemble 
the ability of people to "live the lives they have reason to value" (Sen, 1999:87). Opening up the 
political decision-making process to new objectives and long-term goals indeed constitutes a 
transference of power and voice itself, and a connected change to prevalent structural factors, in as 
much as people's agency is directly connected to the ability to “act and to bring about change”, in 
line with own “values and objectives” (Sen, 1999:18).  
The inclusion of collective goals or values of groups that were previously excluded can be 
interpreted as a modification in those power relations that govern an institutional status quo (von 
Jacobi and Nicholls, 2017a). This is in line with BEPA's (2010) conception of social innovation 
itself, as a process that  "aims to: meet the social demands of vulnerable groups that are not currently 
met by the existing socio-economic settlement; address societal challenges in which the boundary 
between the “social” and “ economic” blurs; and promote a participatory approach to social 
organisation and interactions that centres on empowerment" (see previous section).  
  
Within such perspective, the transformative potential and effects of social innovation need to be seen 
as directly addressing marginalisation on one hand, but also to be contributing towards structural 
change that, in turn, alters the conditions and processes that lead to poverty and social exclusion in 
the first place (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015a). Social innovation in this case targets the social 
process that (re)produces marginalisation and seeks to modify it. This mode of analysis has 
significant implications for policy design, implementation and evaluation - not only within the arena 
of social innovation, but more broadly across other policy domains. If policy makers are to design 
and implement effective social innovation agendas to address marginalisation, it is necessary first to 
identify and address the complexities of the power hierarchies that frame their own policy objectives. 
Such a process implies for policy makers to recognize and overcome their own institutional 
dominance, requiring both self-reflexivity and institutional entrepreneurship (see Nicholls and 
Edmiston, 2018). Importantly, this will require the introduction of politics into the so-far mainly 
apolitical character of social innovation policy making (Edmiston, 2016a). 
To get back to the example of the European Social Fund, Edmiston (2015) outlines how social 
innovation is only officially recognised and supported in a way that reproduces existing social 
relations. Whilst it may be innovatively social in its means, the activities and objectives funded are 
not innovatively social in their ends. That is, the existing funding structures currently limit the 
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capacity for social innovation to significantly disrupt or alter ‘the process of social interactions’ 
(European Commission, 2013a). Whilst social innovation may (and almost certainly does) occur that 
is genuinely transformative as a result of the European Social Fund, this is largely a by-product, 
rather than an explicit objective of operational programmes. Again, initiatives with such design may 
help create the conditions and environment for social innovation to flourish, but they may equally 
lead to an embedding of the existing paradigm and approach to tackling social and economic 
challenges, which does not modify the process at the roots of inequality and marginalisation 
(Edmiston, 2015:13). 
The inability to adopt a self-reflexive approach in which the current institutional dominance is put 
into question seems to be the greatest fallacy of current European social innovation policymaking: by 
both the European Commission and the various DGs within it, Europe 2020 is considered the most 
explicit commitment to the idea, practice, means and ends of social innovation. 
Europe 2020 is said to encapsulate a social innovation approach and ideal (European 
Commission, 2014b). However, upon closer inspection, there is, on occasion, little in 
the way of the social dimension mentioned in much of the strategy. The overall priority 
is to ‘move decisively beyond the crisis and create the conditions for a more 
competitive economy with higher employment’. The relative separation of the social 
and economic objectives of Europe 2020 belies the integrated social market economy 
model espoused by political and policy leaders. A claim to be social or innovative 
doesn’t necessarily count as such or lead to such a transformation (Edmiston, 
2015:13). 
While the European Social Fund has placed an interesting particular emphasis on social 
experimentation and public sector innovation to tackle pressing social need, this emphasis tends to 
operate within the confines of work integration, employment and activation policies, as previously 
mentioned. Similarly to many of the initiatives funded under the Programme for Employment and 
Social Innovation, the concept and potential of social innovation is only accommodated and 
supported in a way that is financially and or strategically valued by EU public bodies and activities.  
In spite of the expansive definition publicly endorsed by the European Commission, its way of 
operationalizing it - precisely within the confines of established institutions and cognitive frames - 
limits the impact of public support for social innovation that seeks to alter structural factors. While 
the European Union has attempted to encourage participatory methods as an approach to domestic 
policymaking and to embed these into networks and organisations engaged in social innovation, the 
reality melts down to consultations on existing strategies: these tend to be more commonplace than 
initiatives that enable citizens to actually set the social and economic agenda themselves. As such, 
activities and measures designed to support social innovation tend in fact to be imposed rather than 
being co-constructed by stakeholders at different socio-structural levels (Edmiston, 2015).  
Whilst it is clear that EU public authorities value the means of social innovation, there is less 
cognitive space and institutional support for the ends of social innovation. At present, those 
experiencing marginalisation and practitioners engaged in social innovation are to some degree 
subject to the ends the European Union deems valuable in scaling social innovation. Furthermore, 
where the ideals and ends of social innovation jolt too strongly with the competing priorities of the 
European Union, it appears its underlying ideals are either lost in translation or sacrificed to 
countervailing concerns.  
The key element behind this dynamics is neglect for structural determinants that need to be addressed 
by social innovation processes that seek to alter power structures. Larger degrees of co-designing are 
necessary to live up to the policy goals the European Commission already endorsed: this however 
requires two crucial modifications to the prevalent logics of social innovation policymaking, much in 
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line with the schemes introduced in part I. On one hand, policy making needs to truly open up to new 
goals and to accept that social innovation may be financed even when not emerging from an own 
political agenda. On the other hand, the power structures within which policymakers find themselves 
to be empowered in, may have to become subject of revision in order to empower the marginalised. 
How EU policy makers perceive social innovation policy 
 
In January, 2017, CrESSI presented intermediate findings to EU policy makers and discussed emerging social 
innovation policy recommendations. The following points were object of discussion, key reactions of policy 
makers are summarized in what follows:  
(1) Collaboration is king (most of the time): Cross-departmental collaboration opens up some of the clearest 
means by which to solve entrenched societal problems and emerging social risks; (2) Protecting the Integrity 
of Sectoral Approaches and Provision: The integrity of the public, private and third sectors is a necessary 
pre-condition for successful strategies that seek to tackle marginalisation through cross-sectoral collaboration; 
(3) Markets Matter: Whilst social innovation policy-making has actively supported the insertion of private 
features into the public and social economy sector, there has been much less policy attention and support 
given to introducing public and social economy features into the private market economy; (4) Moving from 
Incremental to Institutional Transformation: The policy paradigm of social innovation emerged from a 
recognition of the need to address structural factors, but these are addressed in a minimalist way. Whilst in this 
way social innovation policy contributes towards incremental and localised improvement, the prevailing 
socio-political and economic settlement remains largely unchallenged and unchanged. (5) Scaling Initiatives: 
The majority of social (policy) innovation activities tend to be small, localised and short-term by a wide range 
of small players. (6) For And Against: The multiple framing and pursuit of social innovation in public policy 
makes it possible to encourage collective action for a particular outcome or activity, but this equally detracts 
from mobilising resources and individuals against the institutions and determinants that undermine inclusive 
economic growth. 
In response to the findings and recommendations outlined, representatives from European Commission raised 
a number of points for consideration and reflection. 
With regards to the importance of protecting the integrity of sectoral approaches and provision, representatives 
pointed to a number of tensions and challenges arising here. Whilst policymakers recognized the validity of 
the observation, they nonetheless felt that it was necessary and important to mobilise private sector resources 
and activities in ways that enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the public and civil society sector. In 
relation to this point, a number of representatives thought that greater clarity could be provided on the role of 
the market in social innovation policymaking. That is, a more practical distinction needs to be made between 
policy areas where the market matters and where it does not. Representative affirmed that public and civil 
society sectors can greatly benefit from private approaches and logics. They nonetheless recognized that there 
were circumstances where the encroachment of the market into public and civil society spheres was neither 
desirable nor appropriate. In terms of thinking about the particular role of the market in contributing towards 
inclusive economic development, a discussion ensued about whether this was the role of public policy agendas 
seeking to foster social innovation, or whether a more conventional approach would be better suited to this 
project through labour market regulation, enforced and progressive corporate and income taxation and 
conventional social policy approaches to meeting human needs. Some felt that there was an important place 
and role for the market in social innovation policy that related to encouraging fair economic space through 
ethically informed production and consumption practices. With regards to scaling initiatives, one 
representative suggested that it was not necessarily problematic that the majority of social innovations 
supported through public policy were small, time-limited and diffuse. They suggested that once a social need 
was fulfilled, it could be entirely legitimate for actors and organisations engaged in the social innovation to 
cease their activities. However, a number of representatives did rightly suggest that the diffuse nature of a 
social innovation may not necessarily be problematic. Diffuse instances of social innovation across Europe 
may well be fulfilling social needs. However, the problem is increasing the visibility of these activities and the 
diffusion process so that other actors might take these up. The potential of approaches such as social 
franchising were discussed and recognized as one way of achieving this.  
With regards to the final finding and recommendation (for and against), representatives discussed the role of 
(political) participation in social policymaking and how collective action against institutions, actors and 
processes might feature in such a process. Representatives emphasized a number of clear examples where co-
construction and co-creation approaches to policy design and implementation had increased the representation 
CrESSI Working Paper no. 43/2017 – D8.2 Strategic Policy Recommendations (December 2017)    Page 34 | 58 
 
and participation of marginalised groups in the policy process. It was pointed out though that marginalised 
groups were rarely part of the agenda-setting process and this limited the extent to which meaningful political 
participation was being achieved through social policymaking. A discussion ensued about conventional 
approaches to innovation and what role ‘creative destruction’ might have in social innovation activities. 
Whilst some suggested that the object of ‘destruction’ might necessarily be existing sectoral approaches and 
provision, others pointed out that the broader dismantling of existing institutions may be necessary in order to 
adapt to shifting trends in globalization and technological innovation. All representatives agreed that it was 
important to not do away with existing approaches and institutions that present some capacity to address social 
problems and societal challenges.  
In thinking about the role social innovation might play in mobilising collective action and resources (material 
and post-material) against the factors contributing towards marginalisation, a number of representatives point 
out the potential danger of collective identification. Specifically, one representative pointed out that collective 
identification of disadvantaged groups may result in a realignment of power relations, but not necessarily in 
ways that are socially beneficial to the most marginalised citizens in Europe. This representative spoke 
specifically about the rise of right-wing populism and how this might be understood somewhat controversially 
as a social innovation. This lead to a number of other delegates pointing out and agreeing that there was some 
danger attached to politicising the concept and practice of social innovation. Whilst it may help mobilise 
people, it may equally temper the extent to which public institutions are able to support it, or its inclusive 
capacity. 
[extracted and adapted from Edmiston, 2017: Building an Inclusive Economy through Social and Public 
Sector Innovation - Policy Memo] 
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PART 3 - Policy Recommendations 
 
This final part of the report distils the major policy recommendations produced by CrESSI as a result 
of various empirical and theoretical analyses. Each policy recommendation is introduced by a brief 
description and a more detailed explanation. References to case studies investigated in CrESSI are 
meant to provide actual examples of successes or failures with regards to the specific 
recommendation. The examples mentioned are not exhaustive, but just exemplary. For a more 
succinct version of these policy recommendations, see also the EU Social Innovation Policy 
Recommendations, D6.7 (von Jacobi and Nicholls, 2017b). 
 
	
1. Adopt a long-run perspective 
Social innovations for the marginalised do not pay off in the short term, and there 
is a trade-off between costs of interventions and the degree of marginalisation 
addressed. Reaching more marginalised people is more expensive, yet social 
innovations that do so significantly contribute to the construction and renovation 
of social peace. 
In some cases, e.g. the European Social Innovation Competition that takes place yearly, specific 
solutions to the needs of specific (marginalised) groups in society are awarded support. Such 
initiatives tend to represent exceptions to social innovation policy making. Whilst social innovation 
and innovative social policies often enhance capabilities at an aggregate level, they can, at times, fail 
to address the needs of the most marginalised and disempowered citizens. Individuals and groups 
suffering multiple forms of deprivation or exclusion are often the least able and likely to make use of 
services, initiatives and goods (Flanagan and Hancock, 2010; Lord et al., 2011). In addition, agents 
and organisations are often better equipped to address minor aspects of marginalisation, rather than, 
for example, chronic or absolute poverty. In the political economy of social policy and social 
innovation, policymakers, practitioners and social innovators need to be mindful of this and its 
repercussions for tackling poverty and social exclusion (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015). Sever 
marginalisation and social exclusion are characterized by multiple, corrosive disadvantages that cross 
several life domains: from poor health to unemployment, from lack of social relations to poor housing 
and living in harnessing environments, from domestic violence to abuse: often the marginalised are 
entrenched in complex constellations of conditions that make it difficult for them to lead a life in 
dignity. Tackling such multi-dimensional phenomenon requires highly articulated efforts and time. 
When investment is discounted in terms of any of these, this goes to the detriment of the efficacy of 
reducing marginalisation, either because interventions reach only the least marginalised (Molnár, 
2017), or because only parts of the multiple disadvantage are being addressed. 
 
A zoom-in on Social Impact Bonds (SIB): SIBs are payment by results contracts that leverage 
private social investment to cover the up-front expenditure associated with welfare services (Edmiston 
and Nicholls, 2017). In the UK, the desire to improve service quality, mitigate risks associated with 
service experimentation and enhance the social outcomes achieved using public resources has pushed 
for welfare pluralism. SIBs are one of the latest manifestations of this trend seeking to stimulate 
public sector innovation and maximum social impact. In comparison to other EU member states, there 
is a stronger and much more explicit social innovation public policy agenda in the UK. Particularly 
since 2010, political and policy rhetoric has, towards different ends, advanced the case for social 
innovation (Edmiston and Aro, 2016:9). In policy terms, horizontal policy interventions have 
attempted to scale social innovation as a holistic concept. Vertical policy interventions have attempted 
to embed specific aspects of social innovation in service design and delivery to address common (but 
rarely specified) economic and societal challenges in a pre-emptive manner. Perhaps the clearest 
manifestation of policy interest in social innovation in the UK has been the development of social 
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impact bonds. 
 
UK: Insights from Social Impact Bonds EU: Insights from Public Freshwater 
Provision 
Biggest savings to public expenditures on 
chronically marginalised, such as drug-users or 
criminal re-offenders, are obtained when 
focussing on interventions that target these most 
disenfranchised directly. While integrated 
approaches have proven to incur high costs: 
despite of targeting only a small portion of the 
population, they are well justified by their 
significant effect on reducing the undesired 
phenomenon, and thus producing very high 
social benefits. 
The expansion of water supply to all urban areas 
in the 19th and 20th century needed to be 
publicly subsidised. Neighbourhoods in which 
the marginalised were concentrated represented 
an unattractive location for investment as no 
return could be expected. Public health 
improvements, however, function as network 
goods1, accruing all and depending upon 
widespread diffusion/ adoption of healthy 
practices, such as clean potable water. 
 
As a payment-by-results contract that leverages private social investment, social impact bonds have 
been presented as a vehicle through which to support innovative service interventions for 
marginalised groups to improve their social outcomes and opportunities. As such, examination of 
social impact bonds makes it possible to explore the role of private social investment in outcome-
based commissioning and how this affects public sector innovation, the capacity of third sector 
organisations, the social outcomes of targeted populations and the cost-savings accrued through public 
service reforms (Edmiston and Aro, 2016:9).  
Social impact bonds seem to bear great potential for innovation in the public sector, in particular in 
view of delivering targeted, comprehensive and integrated services to specific marginalised groups. 
Their leverage of private capital raises hopes for such services to being financially viable in the long-
term. Yet, social impact bonds are not spared debate: to many, the involvement of private capital is 
not desirable. Furthermore, the complex partnership between private investors, public commissioning 
and third sector organisations implies very high transaction costs that absorb money and time. 
However, the design of social impact bonds, in particular their payment-by-results feature may 
constitute a tool for funding that seeks empowerment of beneficiaries and greater process freedom 
through which service providers can adapt along the way.  
Some elements of social impact bonds are likely to influence future public commissioning too: 
compare this with Edmiston (2016b:6) in which the discussions of delegates during a policy round 
table on SIBs are reported: "A number of delegates felt that more attention and resource should be 
directed towards supporting public sector commissioners. Such support could help commissioners in 
the effective design of payment-by-results contracts, as well as the development of alternative 
strategies of performance management and measurement. In certain instances, this may have the 
capacity to increase the efficiency, effectiveness and equitability of public services without the 
presence of private capital and the high transactions costs associated with this. Beyond this, some 
delegates felt that greater resource was needed to facilitate knowledge transfer between public sector 
commissioners so that they are able to capitalise on lessons learnt from existing SIBs and scale 
successful service innovations more widely across the public sector." 
Social impact bonds therefore represent an interesting example in which the long-term goal of 
tackling marginalisation is approached through an innovative design that reshuffles both, agents 
involved in assessing criteria and metrics (payment by results: the perception of beneficiaries 
matters!) and partnerships across public private and third sector. Investigations made in CrESSI 
																																								 																				
1	Network goods are those that have network externalities, meaning that an additional user of the good has a positive 
effect on the value the product has for others using it.The overall value of the good increases with the number of users.	
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suggests that: a) the potential of SIBs to secure social outcomes is derived more from the small and 
experimental nature of services rather than, purely or even necessarily, the financial mechanisms that 
underpins it; b) that complex social problems require at least some degree of service continuity and 
support infrastructure existing alongside SIBs offering more intensive, if only temporary, assistance to 
target populations; and c) that the tool can only be expected to work in specific contexts, not as a one 
size fits all instrument (Edmiston and Aro, 2016; Ziegler et al. 2017). 
 
2. Invest in the capability to associate 
The ability to associate and to get organised to speak up for one's ideas, needs, 
and proposals is not always given. Especially among the marginalised, the ability 
to be part of a network that can represent, defend and diffuse public requests for 
new solutions is often missing or insufficient. 
Finding bottom-up solutions that actively involve those disadvantaged or that ensure their say in the 
promotion of social innovation relies on the capability to associate. CrESSI research suggests, 
however, that this capability cannot be taken for granted. The disadvantaged do not necessarily 
organize themselves, either in formalized associations, or in social innovation processes. The social 
innovator is likely, at least initially, an actor external to the disadvantaged group (Scheuerle et al., 
2016; Ziegler et al., 2017).  
If the goal is to promote social innovation processes that at least in the medium-term involve the 
“beneficiaries” as active co-shapers of the process, there is a need to actively invest into the capacity 
to associate: examples are network approaches that at the respective community level (neighbourhood, 
village, hamlet) start with information-sharing and group formation, and the building of bridges to 
other, similarly affected, as well as non-marginalised, groups and actors (Molnár, 2017; Ziegler et al., 
2017). While Social Innovation Europe represents a tool for network support, there are margins for 
action in the way this initiative could promote the capability to associate of those that are still not 
organized in functioning networks. 
There are a series of different, rather horizontal ways, in which policy-makers can invest into the 
capability to associate. Education can represent a viable mechanism, by promoting shared values and 
experience. This can facilitate cohesion and trust across different social strata especially in public 
schools, in which there is mixing of different social classes. Enrolment rules can have important 
effects on the quality and diversity of social ties, which also has a bearing on who is taken as example, 
as object of imitation, etc. 
HU: Insights from the Kiútprogram DE: Insights from Decentralized Water 
Management 
Microcredit programmes targeting socially 
excluded groups such as Roma can only be 
effective when they are multifaceted, e.g. when 
they provide cultural and social capital by 
developing capabilities and facilitating 
networking in addition to traditional micro 
loans. This comprises financial literacy, 
vocational and communication training, 
mentoring and business network development. 
Such transversal skills can be provided in 
addition to credit with more integrated 
approaches. 
When local communities seek to resolve issues 
around common-pool resource management, 
such as water provision and wastewater, local 
democratic association laws, such as the right to 
call a town hall meeting, are essential. They can 
facilitate grass-root movements that aim at self-
determination and seek to propose innovative 
solutions to urgent problems, such as the quality 
of drinking water. 
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Furthermore, an early focus on civic education and on learning from concrete involvement in civic 
organization can reduce psychological barriers to getting engaged. Also, curricula can affect the 
respective capacity to aspire of students via textbook examples, specific awards and other initiatives 
that stimulate reflection on own life goals etc. (Ziegler et al., 2017). Labour and unemployment 
policies can also play a role in this sense, e.g. by providing space, incentive and spare time for 
association, as well as by establishing a climate, in which freedom of expression and tolerance reduce 
the real or perceived risk of participating in collective action. Finally, association policy that 
encourages the formation of association, especially among the least advantaged and reduces 
economic, political and administrative costs associated with it can also represent a further political 
instrument (Ziegler et al., 2017). 
 
3. Improve network support 
Networks are crucial for social innovations as they mediate conflicting requests 
and coordinate actors in view of common goals. Existing co-ordination activities 
and new types of intermediaries, who take over these tasks appear to be 
underfunded, more support should reach grass-root movements, especially when 
they create ties between marginalised and non-marginalised communities. 
Social innovations typically involve citizens and seek to support them in having a say in decisions that 
govern basic aspects of their lives. This often implies the involvement of civic groups and networks 
for the coordination of this task. Any support for social innovation that takes this participatory aspect 
seriously should therefore not only (and probably much less) support new ideas and innovations via 
for example project based support and competitions. Instead, an alternative and viable support 
mechanism could focus on networks that have already established themselves and can demonstrate a 
live of their own. The stable number of network members or the duration since the network has 
existed could for example inform regarding the extent of establishment of a network. Networks are 
living, social entities confronted with numerous organisational challenges: how are decision arrived 
at? How to effectively document and share knowledge? How to identify and agree upon rules that 
stabilise interactions and modes of action within the network? These questions crucially require some 
kind of coordination, which however - as typical with public or club goods - has positive externalities 
of non-rival nature (von Jacobi et al., 2018). For this reason, coordination is typically underfunded, in 
line with economic theory.  
 
DE: Insights from Decentralized Water 
Management 
IT: Insights from Solidarity Purchasing 
Groups 
In rural areas of Southern Germany, citizens 
have gathered together to restore their local 
water sources. They needed help and technical 
know-how to do this. They formed a network – 
the IKT, a non-profit organization that provides 
space for peer validation, knowledge exchange 
and lobbying. Such networks generate added 
social value but frequently lack network 
coordination capacities and coaching to fully 
unleash their social and democratic potential. 
Public or private network support can 
compensate this. 
Across Italy, families gather in groups to 
acquire consumption goods produced in 
ethically correct ways. Many of these are 
informal but they represent a new type of 
intermediary between producers and consumers. 
The groups could often increase their reach and 
impact if more support were available. 
Guidelines on participatory certification systems 
and for non-marked based intermediaries would 
help, as these are initiatives typically pursued by 
groups. 
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As other activities with positive externalities, coordination activities justify public intervention and 
support. In the case of support for networks promoting social innovation, the positive spill-over 
effects are not constrained to the innovative process itself but also bear significant synergies with the 
scope of promoting capability to associate more generally. 
Such network support could focus on financial resources to be used for coordination work, as this is 
precisely the kind of work that is largely responsible for additional social value and that at the same 
times is a blind-spot of project focused innovation support (Ziegler, 2017c). Coordination is also 
necessary when new networks are to be constructed that leap across established and internally 
cohesive social groups. Especially for social innovation that targets the marginalised, this may be 
relevant. On the one hand, marginalised groups may generally have less time and facility to associate 
among each other. On the other hand, their position within society is likely to constitute barriers to 
crossing into other, non-marginalised, societal groups. Yet, creating networks that move across 
marginalised and non-marginalised groups is a key challenge for altering social structures that 
(re)produce marginalisation. In view of the profound interactions between networks, cognitive frames 
and attached claims for new institutional solutions, the creation and support of new mechanisms of 
affiliation that may break down previous stereotypes of segregations in social behaviour is of utmost 
importance (von Jacobi et al., 2018). Coordination on behalf of some actor or organisation is likely to 
be necessary however, in order to make the attempts of a new collective identity to arise in a new 
network become reality.  
Another type of network support could come in form of know-how and advice: networks frequently 
emerge from local and regional struggles that - at least initially - frequently require strong leaders. 
Such feature can however - at later stages - create difficult questions of passing on leadership and for 
sharing responsibility within the network: in other words, emergent networks risk high mortality due 
to lack of experience. While these challenges are not new, support to networks could take on the form 
of coaching and exchange between networks to deal with common trouble-shooting and to share 
lessons learnt (Ziegler, 2017c). 
Two different examples of social innovation networks: As previously introduced, Italian Solidarity 
Purchasing Groups (SPG) are groups of individuals or families that self-organize in order to 
collectively buy food or other everyday consumption goods, selecting suppliers of such goods on the 
basis of solidarity and critical consumption criteria. Groups emerge at the very local level, such as the 
neighbourhood or the municipality. Often different groups co-exist for example in large cities. In 
Italy, the prevalently informal movement is supporting mainly small-scaled organic farming but also 
other alternative production realities such as involving ex-prisoners or people with disabilities into the 
manufacturing of goods or services. While a national network officially exists, SPGs tend to prefer 
working autonomously, granting each group independence in the identification and conservation of 
consumption choices and preferences. In this sense, the national network does not seek and wish for a 
systematic scaling or the homogenising of activities. Yet, many groups complain about similar 
difficulties, such as for example the lack of access to spaces in which they can stock and distribute 
products. Targeted network support that refrains from scaling but takes the movement's particularities 
seriously could help many groups overcoming current barriers. 
The interest community for communal drinking water supply (IKT) in Germany is a network for the 
promotion of decentralized water management. It was established in Bavaria (DE) in 1986 out of 
concern that the new threshold values for nitrate (50 mg/litre) would in the light of high de facto 
nitrate values provoke a push towards large freshwater supply systems, away from communal 
freshwater sources. The IKT was founded to push instead for restoration of communal freshwater 
sources and, in 2002, added decentralized wastewater treatment to its mission. While the IKT has 
already elaborated productive modalities of exchange with public institutions at different levels, 
targeted support to the network could help them in making their scope and techniques more visible to 
the European public. 
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4. Compensate disempowering arrangements at the national level 
Social processes that (re)produce marginalisation are shaped by local or 
national institutions. Where this represents a barrier for overcoming the 
marginalisation and exclusion of the respective groups, the roles and possibilities 
of involvement of different policy levels should be reconsidered. There is 
sometimes a need to leap over national governments to counter disempowering 
social processes. 
The interactions between institutions, networks and cognitive frames can reproduce marginalisation. 
A grave example for this is the longstanding marginalised position of the Roma, mainly in Central and 
Eastern Europe. As it seeks to change power relations, social innovation must target all three social 
forces and what connects them, as it is the interdependence of existing social forces that play a crucial 
role in (re)producing marginalisation. National authorities are not a neutral, long-term funders of 
solutions tackling marginalisation, but in part responsible actors in the process of its reproduction. 
Schools and municipalities, employment and regional development policies all potentially contribute 
to its persistence. Under such conditions, even the utilisation of EU funds for the inclusion of the most 
deprived social groups can be ineffective and inefficient, as long as it is facilitated via those existing 
authorities that are constituent part of the social processes (re)producing marginalisation. Leaping 
over political levels from the national to the EU level for direct investment into the social inclusion of 
the most marginalised might provide an alternative option: funds could directly (and really) reach the 
NGOs supporting marginalised communities, bypassing the national and local administrations 
(adapted from Ziegler et al, 2017). 
 
HU: Insights from Social Co-operatives HU: Insights from the Kiútprogram 
Recent regulation in Hungary has disturbed an 
emerging field of social entrepreneurship, as it 
allowed local municipalities to become 
members of the so-called new-type social co-
operatives. A more recent measure introduced in 
December 2016 forced all original social co-
operatives to convert themselves into a new type 
social co-operative by the end of 2017. The 
inclusion of a (local) governmental body into 
the co-operatives strengthens the existing power 
structures, castrating empowerment. 
National authorities are not a neutral, long-term 
finance provider to tackle marginalisation 
problems; rather, they are in part responsible 
actors in the process of reproducing 
marginalisation. In the case of this integrated 
microcredit programme, direct investment by 
the EC has leapt over political levels to directly 
invest into the social inclusion of Roma. Funds 
have reached NGOs supporting marginalised 
communities directly, bypassing the national 
and local administration, and therefore enabling 
a more integrated approach that breaks down 
prejudices. 
 
A zoom into the case of integrating Roma: As the Roma population is the largest ethnic minority in 
Europe, and is mostly marginalised, or even socially excluded, the direct promotion of their social 
inclusion can be a good test case for direct investment that leaps over administrative levels. CrESSI 
research has found that in cases of long-term marginalisation, marginalised people might be better 
supported if investments for inclusion are managed directly by the European Commission instead of 
the member states so as to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the spending of funds. Direct 
investment has the potential to improve the legitimacy of the EU by demonstrating its capacity to link 
investment to long-term social-economic development. Such proposal is not without precedent. 
 
Between 2010 and 2012, the Pan-European Coordination of Roma Integration Methods – Roma 
Inclusion pilot project directly financed activities in the fields of improving the access of Roma 
children to quality early childhood education and care, facilitating self-employment through access to 
finance for marginalised communities, combatting discrimination against Roma people through 
awareness raising campaigns, and improving evaluation methods of Roma integration programmes. 
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These pilots were considered successful, their experiences, however, were utilised by EU member 
states only sporadically or not at all (Molnár, 2017). 
 
The majority of the Roma are disadvantaged in almost all aspects of life: education, employment, 
income, housing, or health conditions. They frequently face discrimination in the fields of education 
and employment. Open or covert prejudices against the Roma are visible in everyday life and in the 
media. While this is generally known, the CrESSI research puts additional emphasis on the fact that 
such disadvantages and marginalisation are closely connected, and reinforce each other though 
interactions between institutions, social networks and cognitive frames. School segregation and 
exclusion from the labour market eliminate possibilities of forming ties with other social groups, 
strengthen prejudices, and erode the ability of those affected to change their own life circumstances. 
The lack of inter-community social ties makes it more difficult to find a job, increases vulnerability to 
local power structures, and has a deeply negative impact on the cognitive frame of the majority of the 
society (Scheuerle et al., 2016). On the side of marginalised people, it leads to a feeling of redundancy 
and undermines self-esteem (Molnár, 2017). Cognitive frames also strongly influence social networks 
and the formation of institutions. 
 
National and local authorities are not a neutral, long-term funder of solutions to tackle problems 
associated with marginalisation, but in part, responsible actors in the process of its reproduction. As 
such actors, they frequently share, or at least are strongly influenced by, the dominant cognitive 
frames in the society. Under such conditions, even the use of EU funds such as of the Structural Funds 
for the inclusion of the Roma can be questionable, consequently ineffective and inefficient, if 
facilitated via the national authorities. 
 
Administrative levels that are more detached from the local reality are likely to be less influenced by 
those cognitive frames and institutions. Therefore, jumping political levels from the national to the 
EU level for direct investment into the social inclusion of the most marginalised may present an 
opportunity for the EU to demonstrate leadership in tackling severe societal problems. The most 
evident opportunity is the post-2020 planning period portion of the Structural Funds intended to 
promote social integration. For this, the EU direct investment needs to tackle a dual challenge 
seriously. Firstly, to ensure funding in sufficiently long-term to foster systemic social innovation 
activities. Secondly, to ensure funding programmes account and accommodate for local institutional 
and regional variation so that social innovation activities reflect and address the specific contextual 
features contributing towards the reproduction of disadvantage.  
 
Beyond this, other strategic possibilities could also be considered such as the further development of 
the Juncker Plan to better include strategic investment that tie social innovations for marginalised 
populations to long-term human and economic development of the EU. The most important areas 
where direct EU investment could be efficient are empowerment of state-independent Roma 
communities, support of NGOs that help Roma communities, civil legal protection, anti-
discrimination and anti-segregation activities, awareness raising, and social innovation projects. 
Finally, while the Roma are an especially important paradigmatic case for the direct investment 
argument, similar opportunities should also be considered for other long-term marginalised 
populations (adapted from CrESSI Policy Memo - The Case for more direct EU-investment). 
 
5. Support the plurality of actors 
Eligibility criteria help foster transparency, but they may hamper new 
collaborations and partnerships among public, private and third sector actors: 
inflexibility introduced by certain types of legislation and criteria for funding may 
have to be revised to support present and future social innovation. 
For the transformative potential of social innovation, the reshaping of old and the formation of new 
networks of actors is a fundamental aspect for achieving effects within society. For policy-making, 
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support to the re-formation or creation of networks comes along with the re-distribution of tasks and 
of responsibilities. Often, the formation of new networks enshrines new methods of sharing tasks (e.g. 
Public-Private Partnerships) or the assignment of responsibilities to new type of actors (e.g. the 
provision of social services through the third sector). New partnerships and emerging actors constitute 
a key opportunity for the identification, experimentation and testing of innovative solutions. Empirical 
investigations implemented in the CrESSI project have shown, that existing rules or laws defining 
eligibility criteria often hamper such new partnerships. Legal frameworks that regulate e.g. public 
provision or the eligibility for public funds often - in an unintended way - constitute barriers of access 
to actors that may have blurred legal identities (informal associations, not legally constituted as 
organisations) or that may resemble new types of actors (e.g. co-working spaces), not properly 
"captured" within the existing laws and regulations (von Jacobi et al. 2018). 
 
IT: Insights from Solidarity Purchasing 
Groups 
HU: Insights from Social Co-operatives 
Families gathering to make collective 
consumption choices often shy away from 
constituting a formal organisation. Yet, current 
legal frameworks stress the necessity of being a 
formal association to access: 1. Public spaces 2. 
Civil society’s councils at local level 3. Funding 
for local social and cultural projects. Thereby, 
the potential social impact of the innovation in 
terms of supporting marginalised farmers 
(acquisition of their products) is reduced. 
Making social co-operatives eligible for the 
receipt of public support when providing social 
services (as e.g. social and child welfare 
services - as typical for the so-called A-type co-
operatives) would be an important step forward 
to make co-operatives more effective in their 
goal to contribute to community development. 
In Hungary, social co-operatives are currently 
not eligible for receiving public support when 
providing these services. 
 
A zoom into Hungarian social co-operatives: social co-operatives were introduced in Hungary as a 
previously unknown legal form in 2006, when the law on co-operatives was substantially amended. 
Their main objective was set as “creating employment opportunities for its unemployed and/or 
marginalised members, as well as improving their social conditions in other ways”. Another legal 
form, the so-called new-type social co-operative, was created when amendment to the law allowed 
local governments to become one of their members (2012). The underlying objective of new-type 
social co-operatives is to create an exit route from the massive, highly expansive public works 
schemes. 
Despite limited public support or recognition of the concept, there is a growing interest in social 
innovation in Hungary. One of the principle factors impelling interest in its application and potential 
is the large inflow of EU funds, much of which is tied to the promotion of social innovation (Kengyel, 
2013). As a result, policy attention to, and interest in, the concept of social innovation has tended to 
entail the adoption of an approach to public governance that coheres with EU policy and investment 
strategies pertaining to social business, innovation, work integration, the sustainability of the social 
economy sector, and the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups. 
As mentioned, in 2012, newly introduced legislation made it possible for local authorities to become 
members of social co-operatives. CrESSI research has critically examined whether these measures 
exhibit the capacity to foster effective social innovation capable of tackling marginalisation (Havas 
and Molnár, 2016a; 2016b; 2017). In particular, tensions were highlighted between the underlying 
principles of co-operatives (especially democratic control by the members, autonomy, and 
independence) and the strict rules for new type social co-operatives (how many members should be 
formerly employed by a public works scheme, how long their membership should be maintained, 
etc.). The bottom-up principle should be a major feature of social co-operatives, but the rules 
regulating the 'new-type' co-operatives overrule this principle (Havas and Molnár, 2016a:3). Without 
appropriate mechanisms and infrastructures of support for social economy organisations and actors, 
these measures are unable to fully capitalise on the opportunities that social innovation presents 
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within a political climate that places very little value on civic participation, democratic accountability 
and human capabilities. 
Comparison with other cases (Edmiston and Aro, 2016:88) confirms that the construction of 
partnerships and flexibility in dealing with eligibility criteria is of crucial importance. In the UK, SIBs 
have been established and supported in ways that contribute towards public sector innovation, but the 
integral role of civil society and private actors has been financed with new sources of money and with 
an outcomes-focus to improve the human capabilities of targeted populations. In Finland, an 
integrated approach has involved policies for social innovation that directly support the capacity 
development of civil society organisations. Whilst the PAAVO programme involved measures to 
improve public service innovation (via regulations, fiscal policy and commissioning), it has also 
pursued a strategy of social change entrepreneurship that has proven most effective in diffusing social 
innovation capable of tackling marginalisation. This has also opened up opportunities for greater 
policy feedback and learning so that lessons are taken on board beyond operational programmes. 
 
6. Review conditionalities of funding 
Shift the funding paradigm from a process-based managerial approach to one 
based on results, in which experimentation and greater flexibility during 
implementation allow to better acknowledge complexity, context-specific 
problem-solving, and innovation; envisage the provision of unsecured loans to 
overcome learned helplessness among the marginalised, or loosen up financial 
sustainability criteria. 
Undoubtedly, project-based and longer-term initiatives are both necessary to innovative initiatives, 
but social innovation policy tends to centre on the former to the neglect of the latter. This perhaps 
stems from an inevitable tension between social impact measurement and the autonomy of social 
innovation actors and organisations supported through public policy and finances (Edmiston and Aro, 
2016:92). There is an intrinsic tension at the source of policy-making that seeks to support social 
innovation, which in turn puts the prevalent logic of project-cycle-management and top-down driven 
policy design into question. First, policy approaches defined in line with the managerial approach of 
"command-and-control" are intrinsically in contrast with the principles of co-creation that actively 
search and embed ideas originated within civil society. Second, policy-making may often attempt to 
isolate a single action or policy target from other, complementary actions or conditioning factors. Yet, 
the interdependencies between social forces highlighted in CrESSI direct the attention of both social 
innovation practitioners and policy-makers to the complex environment within which social 
innovations emerge and unfold. 
For policy-making, this implies the recognition that it is basically impossible to exactly know and 
foresee all interdependencies that characterise a social innovation process. Social innovations are 
unlikely to follow "predictable trajectories", and the possibility to identify "best practices" and to 
transplant “optimal” solutions may seriously be hampered by specific features of other contexts (von 
Jacobi et al. 2018). Less focus on intermediate process control, such as indicators should give way to 
a greater focus on payment-by-results logic, in which the perception of final beneficiaries feeds into 
the monitoring process. This would allow for a gradual opening of funding mechanisms to greater 
empowerment of beneficiaries who would become active agents of change, on the one hand, and 
allow for innovation and the experimentation of new ideas along the way, on the other. 
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HU: Insights from the Kiútprogram EU: Insights from Public Freshwater 
Provision 
Social innovation may have different effects on 
various marginalised groups. If a social 
innovation targets the least marginalised only, 
then the marginalisation of the others could 
even worsen. This becomes particularly evident 
when working with Roma. Constraints on 
financial sustainability of programmes leads to 
the paradox that the worst-off are not being 
helped. Financial sustainability criteria should 
therefore be loosened up when the target is 
tackling severe marginalisation, given the high 
cost of capability building and the provision of 
social capital. 
Benefits of public provision of healthy drinking 
water have been various: beyond targeting 
specific groups (e.g. the marginalised), the 
societal effects have been mayor, although their 
unfolding was unknown ex-ante. Comparison 
across European implementations shows that the 
more public policies ignored the complexity and 
local specificity of social problems, the more the 
solutions adopted have created costly problems 
in the long run. Complexity and unintended 
effects are accrued when more political levels 
act contemporaneously. Funding has to account 
for complexity. 
 
A zoom into the Hungarian Kiútprogram and the need to loosen the concept of financial 
sustainability: this is a project launched by the Polgár Foundation for Opportunities, offering social 
microcredit, aimed at fostering Roma inclusion, in the most disadvantaged regions of Hungary. Its 
first phase, which run from June 2010 until September 2012, was funded by the EU. Kiútprogram 
focusses on participants’ self-employment rather than profitability for the lenders; demonstrating the 
participants’ commitment to break out from the trap of poverty; and empowering them in running a 
viable business in the formal economy through actions that complement the loan. Given the 
importance of capability building and the ensuing costs of these kind of integrated actions, CrESSI 
research (Molnár, 2017; Ziegler et al., 2017; Schimpf et al., 2017; von Jacobi et al., 2018) has 
highlighted that expecting financial sustainability from social innovation for the marginalised seems 
to be a major policy misconception, potentially leading to serious mission drift.  
However, the removal of financial sustainability as a requirement may lead to irresponsible spending 
of public funds. Involving private funders, who are likely to have a strong interest – in most cases 
coupled with the necessary experience and expertise – to check if spending is responsible, can reduce 
this danger. (This solution corresponds to the co-payment system suggested by Le Grand and Bartlett, 
1993). Greater amounts of investment in order to tackle the most marginalised are justified by the 
expected (high) social returns (cf. von Jacobi et al., 2018). 
 
7. Do not "pick the winners" but provide horizontal support 
Horizontal support is here intended to be comprising two slightly distinct 
elements, which however relate to each other. Social innovation requires a stable 
financial basis, not just project funding to create favourable framework 
conditions for the emergence of new solutions. Horizontality also calls for 
approaches that allow for a diversity of solutions to develop, as "scaling up" is 
unlikely to work: diffusion with necessary modifications/adaptations to a given 
context is more promising. 
As previously mentioned, funding social innovation merely through project-based financing may be 
insufficient in order to truly empower the targeted beneficiaries and promote the emergence of 
innovative solutions. More emphasis could be put on enabling framework conditions, which typically 
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require long-term thinking and stable finance. Favourable framework conditions are likely to facilitate 
the emergence of different - possibly competing - solutions to societal problems.  
Beyond this point that calls for more horizontal "thinking" in terms of financing of social innovation, 
supportive policy approaches should also refrain from the temptation to identify a "winner" in the 
sense of an ideal solution to a given type of marginalisation, with the ambition to subsequently “scale 
it up”, which always bears the risks of disregarding that contexts are likely to be rather different. 
CrESSI research strongly suggests that "scaling up" may be a misconception: the diffusion of new 
practices inevitably entails adaptation to the new context. In this case the notion of horizontal support 
called for can be understood as creating the conditions in which various types of innovation can take 
place contemporaneously. Less specific and more horizontal support can furthermore also be 
understood as a way to facilitate the unfolding of solutions that may be able to address multiple and 
interconnected disadvantages contemporaneously. The Finnish case presented below represents a 
successful example in this sense. While the European Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) 
programme already adopts a horizontal kind of logic, particularly in its capacity building and 
guarantee schemes, a more thorough paradigm shift in funding at different policy levels seems to be 
necessary to properly capitalize social innovation processes as drivers of social change.  
IT: Insights from Solidarity Purchasing 
Groups 
FI: Insights from the PAAVO Housing 
Programme 
These self-organised initiatives often encounter 
physical difficulties in their operations, for 
example due to lack of spaces, in which the 
distribution of consumption goods can occur. 
Public spaces require formally constituted 
associations, which go against the logic of the 
movement. Each group further elaborates own 
principles and does not wish to be homogenised 
into a single, national format. Greater impact of 
the social innovation, e.g. through awareness 
rising on organic agriculture and ethical 
consumption lacks supporting mechanisms. 
In their attempt to tackle homelessness, the 
Programme Group of Paavo adopted a 
horizontal perspective, with the aim to 
overcome "silo-thinking" and to mobilize 
different networks, which could represent a 
wide spectrum of organisations and actors. In 
this way, ministries, cities, third sector and 
financing organisations all jointly took part in 
the planning phase and, subsequently, the 
steering committee of the programme. This 
fostered support through a collaborative 
approach that produced a new network of actors 
in operations, especially between service 
providers and local authorities. 
 
A zoom into the Finnish social housing programme PAAVO: emerged in 2007 as part of the 
government’s housing policy. Its aim was to reduce long-term homelessness between 2008-2011. 
While there was a certain degree of freedom and flexibility in terms of its implementation, an 
exceptional and important feature of the government’s housing policy was its duration - 8 years, not 
just over the 4-year term of the cabinet. Experiences, research and knowledge gathered in previous 
housing programmes during the 1990s and early 2000s in Finland and especially in Helsinki were 
used in the PAAVO planning process. It gathered a variety of relevant actors, setting up a network 
between service providers and authorities to the benefit of participants.  
 
In Finland, there is a strong tradition of government-sponsored innovation, particularly technological 
innovation. The concept of social innovation has stimulated considerable debate, but there is still as 
yet, little shared understanding of what social innovation amounts to or entails in Finland. The 
PAAVO housing programme was launched with two phases: “PAAVO 1” over the period of 2008-
2011 and “PAAVO 2” over the period of 2012-2015. To permanently reduce long-term homelessness, 
attention was focused on converting temporary shelters into housing units and on acquiring rental 
housing for the homeless based on the ‘Housing First’ principle.  
 
The financial support system for acquiring, building and re-purposing housing units, as well as the 
implementation of joint-up housing support services, has proven instrumental to the achievements of 
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the programme in reducing long-term homelessness. Similar to other public policies that demonstrate 
some capacity to foster social innovation, the PAAVO programme sought to facilitate new networks 
of governance, action and organisation that transcend existing sectoral boundaries in welfare and need 
provision. For a social democratic welfare regime such as Finland, this presents new opportunities and 
challenges for tackling marginalisation (Edmiston and Aro, 2016:9). One innovative aspect of 
PAAVO, therefore, was the manner in which all relevant actors were brought together and formed 
into an operational network to implement the programme. The co-ordination of the PAAVO 
programme was in some respect ‘special’. This approach to service provision and housing assistance 
was underpinned by cross-governmental and cross-sectoral collaboration and learning. This made it 
possible to better identify and address the multiple and distinctive needs of the long-term homeless 
(Aro, 2016). 
 
 
8. Harvest from the past 
Look back in history to learn from previous processes: old ideas tend to return, 
constellations of actors and adaptation processes during diffusion become more 
evident. 
Historical analysis of social innovation cases can often contribute to the understanding of how 
complex interactions of a given institutional dominance have been put under pressure and modified by 
social innovation processes. Within CrESSI research, the historical analysis of some cases across 
Europe (e.g social housing or freshwater supply) has produced the following insights for social 
innovation policy making: There may not be a neat and clearly identifiable target group. Beneficiaries 
of social innovation can be multiple and very different among each other. In broader and more 
general beneficiary approaches, the social innovation tends to address society as a whole. This means 
that also people who are not severely affected by a social problem (i.e. who are not really 
marginalised) are implicitly addressed through the social innovation process or can potentially benefit 
from it, for example from a good social mix in social housing, or from the reduction of epidemics due 
to healthy potable water. When network goods are targeted, such as in the case of freshwater delivery, 
which also resemble public goods with natural monopoly characteristic, public intervention leads to a 
situation where society as a whole can profit from the social innovation, not just the marginalised, 
which are the immediate target. (Scheuerle et al., 2016:172). Historical analysis shows that when 
benefits of social innovation are envisaged and communicated as multiple, reaching the entire society, 
they are more successfully implemented, as consensus across different societal strata is obtained. This 
is just an example of lessons that can be learned by looking at the past. Generalizations from historical 
analysis should not lead to neglect of context-specificity, however. 
AT: Insights from Social Housing EU: Insights from Public Freshwater 
Provision 
Pressure for the public provision of decent 
housing rose quickly in the city of Vienna in 
1919-1925 due to a massive influx of migrants 
from the previous Austro-Hungarian empire and 
soldiers returning from war. Instead of 
suppressing the "settlers' movement", left-wing 
political factions supported the grassroot 
movement, which started to provide a new 
collective identity, especially through the 
emergence of associations (Vereine) that built 
up important ties to political parties (Social 
Democrats). Together, they managed to 
influence policy agendas for subsequent 
decades. 
Access to clean water used to be considered a 
personal problem: water was a drink for beggars 
while alcoholic drinks or hot drinks (coffee, tea) 
were generally preferred. Water as a healthy 
drink had to be promoted. One driver of the 
pressure for public provision of clean water was 
the considered self-interest of the upper class: 
reduce epidemics (and own risk of infection); 
reduce immoral behaviour of poor (less 
alcoholism, lower costs for prison, less crime). 
Paternalistic motivation led to new thematic 
networks across different professions that 
significantly shaped the movement for public 
provision of clean water. 
CrESSI Working Paper no. 43/2017 – D8.2 Strategic Policy Recommendations (December 2017)    Page 47 | 58 
 
CrESSI research has investigated different historical cases, but the most comprehensive findings have 
been achieved in the historical reconstruction of two social innovations that have achieved 
institutionalization in Europe: the public and universal provision of potable water and social housing.  
Social Housing foresees the provision of adequate housing for those with less purchasing power. It is 
understood as crucial element for social cohesion. Social housing comprises different approaches and 
solutions, in different contexts and moments in time. The historical reconstruction describes and 
analyses developments in Europe from the mid of the 19th century onwards and then goes in depth of 
the circumstances and implementation in one country and especially in one specific city: Vienna 
(AT). Results allow for a consistent account of different transitions, from the period of the settler’s 
movement after the first world war, to the superblock’s period, the era of corporatist housing policies 
and finally neo-liberal economisation. Public Freshwater Provision has been a key social innovation 
that started gaining momentum in the 19th century. Today, it represents an excellent example for 
investigating actor constellations, emergent ideas, policy approaches and the dynamics between them 
that have made it possible for the public sector to deliver fresh and potable water to basically every 
household, across Europe. The historical reconstruction pays attention to the implications of 
infrastructural developments, path dependencies and how to get all groups of society aboard of a so-
called network good. It provides insights on key questions that remain today, e.g. whom (and how 
fast) to include in the network, by which means/pre-conditions, as well as who is responsible, how 
provision is organised. 
History confirms the scope for public sector involvement for optimal funding and framing 
For major social innovations to be provided on a broad scale, such as general access to housing, fresh 
water provision, or generalised access to education, public resources are necessary. Private actors 
usually cannot provide or generate the needed resources sufficiently, given the scale of such tasks 
when they become a generally accessible good. For example, fresh water supply became a public 
assignment in many European countries at the end of the 19th / early 20th century, when it became 
clear that private providers would not built up the supply system as fast and inclusively as expected. 
In many cases, marginalised inhabitants were not connected to the supply system if there was no 
obligation for all to do so. In social housing it quickly became self-evident, particularly after WWII, 
that the extensive need for accommodations required governments to take the lead, since the task was 
beyond the competence or willingness of the (barely functioning) private market industries. The same 
holds for the vast investments required for the infrastructure of generalised education; interesting to 
note in this respect is that the forces currently at work to marketise education build on that initial 
public investment without which they could presumably not get momentum. Social innovators pave 
the way to this understanding, and create or modify solutions that are adaptable for public entities. 
The involvement of public resources bears some consequences, e.g. that they are usually subject to 
allocation debates of different political parties and other societal actors with their different ideological 
backgrounds and motives. 
Further, the targeted beneficiaries of SI can be very different. In broader and more general beneficiary 
approaches, the social innovation rather addresses society as a whole. This means that also people 
who are not severely affected by a problem (i.e. who are not really marginalised) are addressed with 
the social innovation activities and/or can benefit from them, for example for the sake of a good social 
mix in social housing. The set-up of freshwater supply in European countries and the infrastructure 
needed resulted in a situation where society as a whole profited from the social innovation, not just 
the marginalised. As epidemics could be spread by anybody and affect anybody, a broad focus to 
reach the designated target made more sense. Water and hygiene mattered to all, and thus an inclusive 
approach was adopted. Other social innovations take a narrower approach and focus on specific 
communities or even individuals. In early social housing approaches, the ‘skilled and responsible 
workers’ as well as the ‘deserving poor’ were targeted (in contrast to the most marginalised 
‘undeserving poor’; a differentiation that did not matter when it came to fresh water, see above), 
which was, however, also to reduce social tensions and epidemics and to improve worker capacity. 
Later on, due to resource scarcity or legislation, social housing focused more on those really in need, 
i.e. taking a more residual approach. Additionally, ideological influences can result in the focus on (or 
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exclusion of) specific groups, like under the Nazi regime in Germany. 
SI literature often explains the emergence and diffusion of social innovations by “faith, hope and a 
sense of calling” (Westley et al., 2007, p. 82) of proactive inventors. However, this might only be one 
part of the story, at least when it comes to a large-scale adaptation of the social innovation. The 
tensions in the context of the ‘social question’ in the 19th century are a good example of this. For a 
social innovation to be developed and scaled, the interests of different stakeholder groups beyond the 
actual beneficiaries are important too (such as politicians, representatives of the middle-class, or 
industrialists that are interested in productive working capacities and the reduction of social tensions 
and epidemics). This also indicates that the social innovation develops through a process of social 
construction in some respect (cf. Bijker, 2009). Obviously, there is some interpretative flexibility in 
the question of the value of social housing. The altruistic rationale of improving the living situation of 
the poor was not enough for a large pervasiveness of social housing activities. The rationale more 
prevalent within other decisive social networks, such as amongst industrialists and some conservative 
politicians, was to reduce social tensions and ensure a productive workforce and contributed to this 
spread considerably. Similarly, in the case of fresh water supply, it was a combination of hygienic, 
moral, and economic arguments, which raised the acceptance of the social innovation in the whole 
society and helped the social innovation to gain momentum. 
[extracted and adapted from Scheuerle (ed.), 2016: D5.1] 
 
 
9. Improve social innovation data collection 
Treat experiments, including unsuccessful attempts for social innovation, as 
reservoir for future solutions to emergencies. Explore the possibility to gather 
data on empowerment processes. 
CrESSI research has made use of different methodological approaches in order to investigate the 
potential of social innovation to tackle marginalisation. Historical analysis of - by now - 
institutionalized social innovations has helped reconstruct their ecosystems and lifecycles. An 
important learning that emerged from this piece of research is to give a chance to niches, in other 
words social innovations that have not made it to the mainstream. History seems to teach that there is 
no one-size-fits-all solution, which undermines the currently prevalent paradigm of "scaling up". 
Demands and possibilities for solutions might vary from context to context. 
Historical analysis highlights that in general decentralised solutions should be preferred, although 
costs tend to get lower if standardisation is introduced. Standardization however also bears risks, in 
particular because it can create path dependencies (e.g. through infrastructural arrangements) with 
long-term lock-in effects.  
 
EU: Insights from Primary Data Collection 
in Three Countries 
EU: Insights from Historical Analysis 
Subjective perceptions of participants in social 
innovation experiences are good measures to 
account for their multidimensional impact. 
While the application of experimental designs 
(RCT) is difficult in the case of social 
innovations because of unclear boundaries of 
participants and "control groups", empirical 
attempts to capture "agency" and 
"empowerment" improvements hint that social 
innovation has important, often immaterial, 
effects. Changes to intangible social structures 
(ways of thinking, personal relations) can 
explain long-term societal change. 
Value the niches, including unsuccessful social 
innovations or those that have not experienced 
substantial scaling. Historical analysis of these 
experiences shows that a quick spurt for the 
mainstream does not hold a solution in the long 
run. There is no one best way. Depending on 
resources available locally, constellations of 
interests and cultural preferences, a solution that 
works in one place might not be very useful 
elsewhere. Path dependencies and lock in 
effects make subsequent, corrective changes 
difficult and costly. A reservoir of solutions may 
help identify approaches in future emergencies. 
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History shows that there is no single way to success: different variations of the same solution can 
emerge in different contexts. Niche solutions could be understood as test beds for future solution 
approaches ready to be applied when need occurs. The analysis of social innovation processes over 
100-150 years further confirms that even stable solutions are not eternal. Discourses and negotiations 
will again erupt if the framework conditions in which a particular social innovation had found an 
equilibrium change again. Therefore, a reservoir of niche solutions can be of help as it conserves the 
memory of alternative solutions already existent, ready to be taken up (Schimpf et al., 2017: 34). 
Besides historical reconstructions of social innovations in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
century, CrESSI research (von Jacobi and Chiappero-Martinetti, 2017; von Jacobi et al., 2018) also 
implemented empirical investigation of ongoing social innovations in Europe, posing particular 
attention on subjective perceptions of participants. In order to gather comparable information across 
three European cases, a primary data collection was coordinated that used mixed methods, combining 
qualitative and more exploratory interviews with social innovators with more structured responses to a 
survey that gathered subjective opinions and perceptions of active participants and control groups.  
The data collection took place between October 2015 and May 2016 and investigated (a) 
complementary currencies in the Netherlands and the role they have in reducing marginalisation 
through greater access to credit or employment opportunities, in particular by promoting the local 
economy; (b) solidarity purchasing groups in Italy and their potential for reducing marginalisation of 
small-scale, organic farmers and other producers that embed a solidarity-value in their products and 
services; (c) communal interest groups in rural and remote areas of Germany that seek self-
determination in water provision and waste water management and the role that these groups can play 
for local empowerment. As part of CrESSI’s multi-level theoretical framework, detailed attention was 
paid to capturing (1) subjective evaluations of agency and change that may be attributed to 
participation in the social innovation; (2) the role and importance of specific social forces such as 
institutions, cognitive frames and networks, for the implementation and success of the social 
innovation; (3) the possibility of singling out the social impact of the studied processes by using 
control groups. 
The results obtained showed that participants expect social innovations to change people's minds, 
altering cognitive frames, or mental structures. There is also evidence for participants to have 
benefitted from social innovation, again mainly by acquiring intangible opportunities, such as new 
knowledge and social relations that have positive implications for their business. Agency 
improvements and a connected sense of empowerment across different dimensions of life (cultural, 
economic, security-related, natural and political) appear to underpin these perceived benefits. For 
future investigations of social innovations, data collection efforts should make sure to include 
subjective perceptions on empowerment among social innovation participants. 
 
 
10. Fiscal policies for social innovation 
Design preferable tax conditions for organizations, networks and activities that 
embed social values or that facilitate the spread of network goods, make use of 
progressive and earmarked taxation to direct funds towards specific social needs. 
Given the characteristic of social innovation to be pursuing a solution to a pressing social need, public 
support for its goals are typically justified. As mentioned earlier in this report, social needs often 
require public finance to overcome market failures, which are typical of goods with positive 
externalities. The externalities associated with the goods and services provided through social 
innovations are furthermore often intangible, feeding into a process of social cohesion and peace, 
therefore constituting an 'asset' for the public good. For these reasons, leveraging public finance in 
support of social innovation is economically fully justifiable. 
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Earmarked taxation can be one tool to guarantee the stable provision of funding for long-term goals of 
tackling marginalisation. The case of social housing in Vienna is considered a success in terms of how 
this social innovation has been able to contribute to the construction of a more equitable and cohesive 
society.  
 
EU: Insights from Public Freshwater 
Provision 
AT: Insights from Social Housing 
Across different European countries, a mixture 
of sanctions, tax reliefs, subsidies and rewards 
have been used by public municipal authorities 
in order to make sure every house(hold) has 
access to clean and affordable drinking water as 
well as waste water treatment. Fiscal policies 
were necessary in order to redirect market 
forces towards poor neighbourhoods, which 
otherwise would have been left out of the 
infrastructural development, due to insufficient 
purchasing power and lack of profit for 
investors. 
Social Housing in Vienna at the beginning of 
the 20th century has been largely made viable 
through an important tax reform, which 
earmarked the earnings of the "Construction 
Tax", paid by both, home owners and tenants in 
a progressive fashion, that however spared poor 
families. In addition, earnings of taxes on luxury 
goods, such as champagne or expensive 
vehicles, were also earmarked in order to flow 
into funds for public construction of social 
housing. 
 
In 1910, a share of the housing tax was earmarked for a housing charity fund, which was a financial 
foundation for charitable housing. Until 1918, some 8,000 dwellings were constructed through it 
(Giesecke in Schimpf et al. 2017:267). A new building tax passed in January 1923, which was tied to 
Vienna's newly acquired independence as city with its own tax sovereignity and the Social Democrats 
holding absolute majority in the city council. As Giesecke (in Schimpt et al., 2017:268) describes: 
"tenants did not pay a regular rent to landlords but a tax to the city and this money was invested into 
the construction of new public housing. Thus the income was earmarked for the building of housing. 
The taxes were graduated in accordance to the size and location of the home and the financial abilities 
of the tenants. Poor people in small homes paid only little or no tax. It was a progressive mass and 
luxury taxation reflecting the creed of social justice, which implied that those who already had a home 
should help those who did not." While this tax reform inserts into the austro-marxist inter-war 
context, it has had profound effects in capitalizing the huge impact of social housing on the reduction 
of socio-economic inequalities - in the long-term. 
 
11. Improve legislation in specific areas 
Some fields of legislation appear to be key-areas for social innovation, such as 
e.g. the regulation of social co-operatives, or specific laws that aim at improving 
protection and political voice of specific vulnerable groups in society, e.g. Roma 
or migrants. 
As emerged in previous sections of this report, social innovation and its goal to pursue solutions for a 
pressing social need often justify public intervention. While one kind of support can come in terms of 
funds and resources, another crucial typology of support comes through legislation that on one hand 
(a) keeps opportunities for innovation open, in particular by allowing new alliances and forms of 
intermediation across different modalities of providing goods and services (informal, community 
based, new collaborative alliances across the public private and third sector, see Ziegler and von 
Jacobi, 2018); (b) specifically targets and provides protection mechanisms for those segments of 
population that are marginalised by on-going and prevalent social processes. Again, historical analysis 
confirms that the combination of protection and provision of funds can be "ground-breaking" in the 
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attempt to tackle marginalisation. 
AT: Insights from Social Housing NL: Insights from Complementary 
Currencies 
Social housing in Vienna has been tied to 
legislative initiatives that explicitly sought to 
protect and to provide greater voice to specific, 
marginalised groups: in this case, migrants/poor 
tenants of low-quality housing. The "new tenant 
protection policy" was a national law passed at 
the beginning of the 1920s, introducing limits to 
the rise of rents for specific types of housing, 
based on their date and reason for construction 
as well as on who had paid for it. Concretely, 
this guaranteed low rents to those relying on 
social housing. Voting rights for migrants were 
also introduced. 
Complementary currencies, or private money 
systems often stimulate the local economy by 
providing alternative means of payment and by 
focussing on products and services that embed 
local production and ethical values. Current 
legal voids in how such activities should be 
taxed/linked to social benefits, however, 
represent an obstacle to the growth of these 
initiatives. Clear rules should be developed 
about the relation between transactions in 
private money systems and fiscal and social 
benefit obligations. Avoid banning private 
money as they often have social and 
environmental benefits, and contribute to 
technological innovation. 
 
Examples of new or missing regulation: Complementary Currencies or 'Private Money' systems are 
private media of exchange that function alongside the official national currency ─ legal tender, the 
euro. Examples of CCs are local exchange trading systems (LETSs), regional money, time banks, 
commercial barter systems and crypto currencies. They are usually designed to promote a range of 
'new-economics' inspired goals of sustainable development and often compensate contractive 
monetary policy through alternative mechanisms of liquidity injection, which can represent an 
impulse for local economies (van der Linden and van Beers, 2017). Private moneys are neither issued 
nor guaranteed by governments (states) or a delegate thereof (central banks), but are instead based on 
private arrangements, which therefore constitute the base of trust (Bank of England 2015). Two well-
known forms of private moneys are "complementary currencies" also referred to as alternative 
currencies or community currencies, and "cryptocurrencies" or digital currencies. In the last decades 
the number of private (digital) moneys has increased rapidly. Seyfang and Longhurst (2013) found 
3,418 complementary currencies globally. After the introduction of the first cryptocurrency in 2009, 
Bitcoin, the number of cryptocurrencies has increased to 4,076 in 2017 (van der Linden and van 
Beers, 2017:302). CrESSI research on complementary currencies in the Netherlands seems to show 
how their potential in introducing more local exchange into the economy is currently hampered by 
legal voids, which for example link economic transactions occuring outside of the legal tender to the 
prevalent system of social benefits and taxation. 
With reference to another example, in Finland, the implementation of the social housing programme 
PAAVO (see previous section of this report) has been dependent on a series of important changes in 
legislation, which made it possible to allocate public resources to the reduction of homelessness 
amongst the long-term homeless. "The Act on interest subsidy for rental housing loans and right of 
occupancy housing loans defined the status of non-profit social housing corporations and social 
housing construction. This Act regulates the social aims of social housing corporations, how 
dwellings can be applied for, and how profits from these corporations are shared. An Act on subsidies 
for improving the housing conditions of special groups regulates the issuing of investment grants to 
improve housing conditions of those whose income is exceptionally low and who require support 
services in their housing, because of substance misuse, mental problems or other corresponding 
problems" (Aro, 2016:2). 
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12. Widen intellectual space for social innovation 
Awareness rising among policy-makers is necessary, in particular regarding 
openness for solutions outside of the market, e.g. self-provision, informal or 
communal provision; but also the recognition of interacting/interdependent social 
structures that are at the roots of marginalisation is key. 
Pan-European and domestic policy-makers need to create intellectual, institutional, and economic 
space for social innovation. Public bodies and regulations need to create intellectual space by giving 
greater consideration to how policy design, implementation, and evaluation might better capture, 
assess and reward the impacts of social innovation. Institutional space (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
might be supported through an increased capacity for governance systems and processes to operate 
within a climate of uncertainty, experimentation and risk. Policy-making can further enlarge such 
space by recognizing the need to go beyond the market or the organized public sector when it comes 
to social innovation: self-provision, informal or communal provision often constitute important 
cradles of social innovation practices. Given the non-monetary and diffuse nature of the impacts of 
social innovation, significant public funding and support is needed. Where this is not possible, public 
bodies should only leverage private sector investment when the diffuse, long-term and non-economic 
returns on an investment are valued and recognised as the principle objective of social innovation 
(Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015b). 
To widen intellectual space in social innovation policy-making, public policies need to challenge 
assumptions surrounding self-interested, so-called ‘rational’ choice. Public deliberation and 
consultations, such as the public consultation on the Europe 2020 strategy should be deepened and 
extended to identify and give credence to the social and economic commitments that EU citizens 
value. The functioning of the social market economy furthermore needs to be understood as a crucial 
feature of the environment in which social innovation unfolds - as both a means and end that can give 
expression to social commitments. Economic growth and the function of the market are the means 
rather than the end – that is, a ‘means to expanding the real freedoms enjoyed by the members of the 
society’ (Nicholls and Edmiston, 2015b). 
 
 
HU: Insights from Social Co-operatives EU: Insights from Public Freshwater 
Provision 
Social co-operatives in Hungary initially faced 
the challenge to overcome the negative 
perception of co-operatives tied to the forced co-
operatives established in the late 1940s up to the 
1960s. Attempts to widen the scope of social co-
operatives failed also due to insufficient political 
will to support such enlarged space of action. 
Recent developments referred to in policy 
recommendations No. 4 and 5 strongly suggest 
that awareness-raising activities among policy-
makers to explain the true nature of (social) co-
operatives are still needed. 
Successful institutionalization of public and 
universal freshwater shows that 'vision' on 
benefits produced must go beyond market 
logic. The provision of clean water has 
produced significant societal benefit by 
reducing epidemics. For policy-making it is 
important to identify benefits for different 
groups in society: if all tend to profit, the 
support of the process is stronger than if only 
a part of society is targeted. Marginalised 
people will in the long run profit more if 
actors from different backgrounds and of a 
broader movement co-shape the process.  
 
In view of the embeddedness of both marginalisation and social innovation into structural, 
interdependent processes, it is necessary to introduce measures that intervene on markets actors and 
institutions at the same time to sustainably and meaningfully address the societal (structural) 
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dynamics that lead to marginalisation. Recognition of such double-track of intervention - at the micro 
level, wherever it is possible to nurture individual capabilities directly; and at the meso level in order 
to modify or alleviate social processes that (re)produce marginalisation - is of utmost importance if 
social innovation policy-making is to successfully contribute to the reduction of inequalities. Current 
practice hints that such recognition is insufficient across different stakeholders, but crucially, 
amongst policy-makers. Compare this, for example, with Edmiston and Aro (2016:92): social impact 
bonds (SIBs) in the UK focus on the attainment of social outcomes that address certain factors of 
disadvantage that may lead to marginalisation (e.g. poor educational attainment), but do little to 
address the structural under-unemployment endemic to regions faced by poor economic development 
and growth. Equally, social co-operatives – in principle – present an opportunity to improve the 
‘employability’ of disadvantaged groups without sufficient attention to the prospect for labour 
market (re-)integration. In certain instances, social innovation policy-making fails to consider how 
the positive attainment of social outcomes (and their subsequent utility) is conditional upon a broader 
set of structural factors that shapes the prospects for ‘resources’ to be effectively transformed into 
human capabilities.  
Such logic may foster incremental social innovation, but it invariably leads to remedial, rather than 
systemic public policy instruments. In these cases, the potential of social innovation is likely to be 
constrained in terms of its success in addressing social inclusion and cohesion. CrESSI research 
suggests that where public policy agendas and instruments simultaneously target a set of factors of 
disadvantage that cause marginalisation in a given situation, it is possible to foster a more disruptive 
kind of social innovation. In Finland, for example, the PAAVO housing programme not only 
supported long-term homeless people to define and pursue their own ends through housing support 
and social services; it also addressed a shortage of affordable and secure accommodation for targeted 
populations. This entailed a broader, structural change to the factors causing homelessness that has 
proven highly effective (Edmiston and Aro, 2016:93). Similarly, the historical case analysis of social 
housing in Vienna shows that the parallel addressing of individual and structural factors of 
disadvantage has led to the successful integration of marginalised groups into a more equal society.  
 
With this in mind, it seems that sustained and long-term commitment from public decision-making 
bodies, coupled with the orchestration of their policy tools, is necessary to foster those kinds of 
systemic and disruptive social innovations that can successfully tackle marginalisation. Any such 
commitment necessarily needs to be capable of meaningfully addressing both the causes and effects 
of marginalisation processes. 
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